In this journal ten years ago, Robert K.
Miller Jr. and I published an article,
"The Meritocracy Myth" (2004) that
summarized the main themes of a book
that we had published with the same
title. This article is an update
and summary of the third edition of
book, The Meritocracy Myth
(2014). In The Meritocracy Myth,
we challenge the widely held assertion
that in America people get out the
system what they put in it based
exclusively or primarily on their
individual merit. According to the
meritocracy myth, America is a land of
unlimited opportunity in which
individuals can go as far as their
individual talents and abilities can
take them.
We do not say that
individual merit is a myth; rather, we
assert that the presumption that the
system as a whole fundamentally operates
on the basis of merit in determining who
gets what and how much is a myth.
Non-merit factors that neutralize,
suppress, or even negate the effects of
merit also matter. We contend that the
dominant ideology of meritocracy
overestimates the effects of merit on
economic outcomes like income and wealth
while underestimating the effects of
non-merit factors. All of the
merit and non-merit factors we
identified in the first edition of The
Meritocracy Myth are still
operative. In the ten years since
publication of the first edition of The
Meritocracy Myth, trends suggest
that the non-merit factors have likely
become even more important.
I will first briefly summarize the merit
and non-merit factors related to getting
and staying ahead in America that we
initially identified in The
Meritocracy Myth.
Next, I will discuss recent trends that
have likely increased the importance of
non-merit factors. Finally, I will
discuss policy proposals and prospects
for the future.
On Being Made of
the Right Stuff
In The Meritocracy Myth, we
identified a formula for success that is
generally associated with individual
merit. We refer to this formula as
"being made of the right stuff" which
includes having innate talent, working
hard, having the right attitude, and
playing by the rules.
Innate Talent
or Capacity
The
central issue is not whether being
smart, clever, or shrewd or possessing
extraordinary cognitive or physical
capacity helps at least some people get
ahead. It clearly does. The
issue is how much difference does it
make and for how many. This is a
complex issue and it is difficult to
know precisely what mix of innate
endowments and environmental influences
affect economic outcomes. Most social
scientists and neuroscientists now
conclude that what matters is a
combination of both and that these
factors interact in complex ways.
Capacities alone produce no
effects. We do not know, for
instance, how many potential world class
violinists there are out there who have
the coordination and "ear" for music to
become world class violinists but who
never picked up a violin. What
matters more than capacities alone is
that capacities are identified,
developed, and cultivated to an elite
level. Beyond minimum thresholds (i.e.,
being smart enough, being talented
enough, being coordinated enough, and so
on) evidence suggests that additional
increments of raw capacity probably have
negligible economic return for most
people in most fields of endeavor.
In short, we contend that sufficient
talent or capacity to be economically
successful is not rare or in short
supply; instead, there are likely vast
pools of untapped innate talent or
capacity within the general population
that are never identified, cultivated,
or fully realized.
Hard Work
When Americans are
asked to identify reasons why people are
successful, they almost always answer
"hard work" or some variant. This
conventional wisdom is rarely
questioned. However, what does
working hard really mean? Does it
refer to the number of hours worked, the
intensity of effort expended per unit of
time worked, or the number of calories
burned in the execution of work tasks or
some combination? The data
indicate that Americans in general work
more hours than workers in most other
industrial societies. There is
also a biological limit to how many
hours one person can work in any one
day. Among Americans who work full
time, there is simply not enough
variation in hours worked to account for
the substantial and growing extent of
income and wealth inequality. This
is because compensation for work is more
directly related to the kind of work
people do rather than the number of
hours worked or the intensity of effort
exerted (Kalleberg, 2011).
At the top of the system, the really big
money in America comes not from working
for a living at all but from ownership
of property—especially the kind of
property that produces additional wealth
such as stocks and bonds, real estate,
business assets and so on. Much of
this type of wealth is inherited which
requires neither talent nor hard work.
On the other hand, those who work the
most hours and expend at least the most
physical effort in society are often the
least well paid. Hard work matters, but
in terms of compensation, what people do
matters much more than how "hard" they
are doing it.
Having The
Right Attitude
Having the "right attitude" is
associated with qualities such as
ambition, a sense of personal
responsibility, willingness to defer
gratification, persistence in the face
of adversity, willingness to take risks
and so on. Attitudes are related
to other attitudes and nuances of
meaning among them tend to blend
together so pinpointing a particular
combination of "right" attitudes for
success becomes difficult. Attitudes or
orientations that, for instance, make
for a successful insurance salesperson
may be different than attitudes or
orientations that make for a successful
novelist. It is also not clear what
attitudes are individually determinative
of economic success as opposed to being
merely associated with it or a
consequence of it. It is one
thing, for instance, to think of the
poor as having a present time
orientation because they are thrill
seekers who live for the moment and
another thing altogether to say that,
regardless of one's personal value
system, one is forced to be present
oriented if you are not sure where your
next meal is coming from. Much of
what passes for "the right attitude" is
also likely to be at least partially the
result of differential access to
preferred forms acting and behaving such
as comportment, demeanor, and
presentation of self to others
(interpreted by others as "attitude")
but is more of a reflection of social
class background than uniquely personal
or individual attitudes.
Cultural values such as heavy emphasis
on educational achievement and
entrepreneurial success are sometimes
associated with more economically
successful minority populations such as
some Asian ethnic groups. While these
values may be associated with higher
levels of economic success, these
orientations may also have structural
origins. There is some selection
bias, for instance, among recent Asian
immigrant populations of persons with
already high levels of educational and
professional achievement.
Entrepreneurial activity also may be
prompted by both discrimination in wage
employment and by the capacity to pool
capital for investment among extended
kinship networks and ethnic groups with
communal orientations more common in
some cultures than others. In
short, such cultural values may have
some effect on economic outcomes but
these too are often mediated through
economic and structural circumstances
(Wilson, 2009).
Playing By The
Rules
"Playing by the rules" or having high
moral character and virtue is also often
considered part of the merit formula for
success. However, there is little
evidence that the economically
successful are any more honest than the
less successful. While honesty and
integrity are certainly worthy goals in
their own right, we suspect that playing
by the rules probably limits rather
enhances prospects for economic
success. The logic of this
argument is that those who limit
themselves to strictly honest means to
get ahead have fewer opportunities to do
so than those who do not limit
themselves in this way. The
indirect evidence for the
wealth-enhancing character of unethical
behavior comes from the significant
amount of white collar crime in America.
Such criminal activity includes
corporate fraud, health care fraud,
financial fraud, mortgage fraud,
insurance fraud, marketing fraud, and
money laundering. Much of
this type of crime is hidden in
financial complexities and often goes
undetected. Suffice it to say at least
some of the wealth of financiers,
executives, and professionals has been
acquired through less than ethical
means. This is in addition to wealth
realized from the sometimes highly
lucrative so-called "irregular" or
"under the table" economy much of it
related to vice in the form of drug
trafficking, prostitution, pornography,
racketeering, smuggling, gambling and
the like. Clearly wealth itself is
not an indicator of moral superiority.
Non-merit
Barriers to Mobility
In the first edition of The
Meritocracy Myth, we identified a
variety of non-merit factors that
collectively blunt the effects of merit
factors and limit opportunity for
mobility. I will briefly summarize
these factors below.
Inheritance
The
most important of these non-merit
factors is the effect of inheritance.
Getting ahead in American is often
described in the image of a foot race
with the fastest runner—presumably the
most meritorious--breaking the tape at
the finish line. But the race to
get ahead does not start anew with each
generation. Instead, the race is
more like a relay race in which we
inherit a starting point from our
parents. With the rare exceptions of
childhood abuse or neglect, most parents
want the best for their children and
will do what they can to invest in their
children's futures. What differs
is not the motivation of parents to
invest in their children's futures but
the capacity of parents to do so.
We identify a set of cumulative
non-merit advantages that are available
in varying degrees to those starting
further ahead in the system to all but
the poorest of the poor who have no
advantages to provide. In this
sense, only those who start out life at
the very bottom of the system rely on
merit alone to get ahead. All
others pass on at least some non-merit
advantages to their children which
include enhanced childhood standards of
living, differential access to networks
of power and influence, differential
access to prestigious cultural capital,
intervivos gifts or transfer of material
resources from parents to children while
both are still alive, greater health and
life expectancy at birth, and the
inheritance of bulk estates when parents
die. To the extent that parents
are ultimately successful in advancing
their children's future through
investments they make or advantages that
are passed on to children who start
further ahead in the race to get ahead,
then the system operates on the basis of
inheritance rather than merit, with the
effects of inheritance coming first
rather than the other way around.
As wealth becomes more concentrated, the
capacity of those at the very top of the
system to pass on advantages to
successive generations also
increases. In a recent
comprehensive analysis of inequality
trends worldwide, wealth economist
Thomas Piketty estimated that at least
50-60 percent of all total private
capital held in the United States is
derived from inheritance (2014:428).
Given current trends, he anticipates
that this percentage will likely
increase in the future, especially if
overall economic and demographic rates
of growth continue to decline. This is
because lower rates of economic and
demographic growth in capitalist
societies create less dynamism in the
system as a whole and therefore less
overall opportunity. These trends
have the effect of locking in advantages
of those already at the top of system.
Social
Capital
Inheritance, in turn,
is related to access to social capital,
or the value of who you know.
Almost everyone has networks of friends
and relatives. What differs is the
capacity of these networks in terms of
access to power, information, and
resources. In short, it
helps to have family and friends in high
places. Americans have a love/hate
relationship with social capital.
We love it when it works for us (that
is, when we are advantaged because we
"know" someone who can assist us) but we
hate it when we are victimized by it
(for instance, losing a job or a
promotion over a less meritorious person
who had connections higher up the food
chain than we do). A growing body
of research supports the folk wisdom
that says that who you know matters for
job placement and promotion beyond merit
alone (cf. DiTomaso 2013; Fernandez and
Galperin, 2014).
Cultural
Capital
Inheritance is also related to access to
prestigious forms of cultural
capital. Cultural capital refers
to knowledge of ways of life of the
groups to which we belong which include
norms, values, beliefs and codes of
conduct. Full acceptance in
privileged groups in society requires
knowledge of the ways of life of those
groups. The culture of the group
separates insiders from outsiders.
Knowing and abiding by these cultural
ways of life are required to maintain
one's status as a member in good
standing with the group. By
growing up in privilege, children of the
elite are seamlessly socialized into
elite ways of life through a kind of
social osmoses. This kind of cultural
capital has been commonly referred to as
"breeding," "refinement," "social
graces," "savoir faire" or simply
"class" (meaning upper class).
Those who aspire to elite circles must
acquire this form of cultural capital
from the outside in, which is much more
difficult to learn and constantly risks
exposure of more humble origins or
negative labeling as a "social climber."
Not having the "proper" demeanor and
comportment associated with the most
already privileged groups in society may
be misinterpreted as "evidence" of
lack of individual merit or worthiness
unrelated to the performance of work
tasks. Recent research confirms a
pattern of cultural advantage for
affluent children in educational
settings (Calarco, 2014; Lareau, 2011)
as well as a cultural advantage of job
seekers beyond merit considerations who
share cultural traits with
perspective employers in the labor
market (Rivera, 2012).
Education
Education is both a merit and non-merit
factor in the race to get ahead.
It is a merit factor in the sense that
grades, credits, and diplomas are
"earned" and cannot be directly
inherited, purchased, or
appropriated. However, education
is also a non-merit factor since access
to educational opportunities and quality
of education received is highly tracked
by social class and as a result
educational attainment is largely
reproduced across generations. Unequal
access to educational opportunities
occurs for a variety of reasons,
including unequal funding of public
schools largely based on local property
taxes, the option of exclusive private
schools for the wealthy, and the unequal
effects of social and cultural capital
on educational attainment.
A substantial body of new evidence on
the effects of education on life
outcomes emphasizes the casting of the
"long shadow" of early childhood
development on subsequent academic and
adult success (Ermisch, Jantti, and
Smeeding, 2012, Duncan and Murnane,
2011, Alexander, Entwisle, and Olsen,
2014; Smeeding, Erikson, Jantti,
2011). Cognitive and
sociobehavioral traits related to
"school readiness" are highly related to
socioeconomic background.
Privileged children are already ahead of
the less privileged in cognitive
ability, social skills, and preferred
forms of cultural capital when they
enter school. Privileged children
attend better schools in safer
neighborhoods staffed by more competent
and appropriately credentialed teachers.
In addition to options for private
schools and locations in upscale
communities with reputations for "good
schools," privileged parents invest more
in a variety of other educational
amenities for their children such as
books, computers, tutoring and
preparation services, music lessons,
summer camps, educational travel and
other educational and cultural
enrichment activities. Moreover,
the gaps in spending for these types of
activities between high-income and low
income parents have increased over time
(Kornrich and Furstenberg, 2013).
Privileged parents are also likely
themselves to have high educational
attainment and to be familiar with "how
the system works" and "how to work the
system," intervening with teachers and
school administrators, often very
assertively, on behalf of their children
(Lareau, 2000).
At the college level, trends are showing
increase costs of higher education and
rising amount of student borrowing and
debt at the same time there is a
diminished job market for college
graduates. Government subsidies
for higher education have been sharply
reduced and the costs have been passed
on to students and their families.
Student debt nearly tripled between 2004
and 2012 and by 2010 surpassed credit
card debt as the second largest form of
household debt after mortgages (Brown
et. al. 2014). Ultimately,
this makes access to higher education
less available and more costly for the
less affluent independent of the merit
of individual students.
Reduced Rates
of Self Employment
In
addition to education, being
self-employed and starting a new
business has historically been an
important pathway toward upward mobility
in America. Indeed, starting a
business from scratch, striking out on
your own, and being your own boss in
many ways epitomizes the American
Dream. Being self-employed
exemplifies independence, initiative,
self-reliance and rugged
individualism—virtues held in high
regard in American society. However, the
percentage of the labor force which is
self-employed has dramatically fallen
overtime from an estimated 80% in 1800
to approximately 10% overall and about
7% of the nonfarm labor force today.
Despite the entrepreneurial mystique
surrounding self-employment, the reality
for many is less than glamorous with
many working long hours often for
effectively lower earnings after having
to fund their own health care,
vacations, and retirement benefits. Some
reluctantly resort to involuntary forms
of self-employment when wage or salaried
jobs are unavailable, including
self-employment in the irregular and
often illegal "underground" economy. The
decline in self-employment has
paralleled the ascent of large
corporations and franchise operations.
Because of economies of scale and the
ascendance of large scale corporations
that create barriers of entry for sole
proprietorships, we contend that
entrepreneurial pathways to mobility are
less likely now than in the past.
Luck
We also identify
luck—both the good and bad kind—as a
non-merit factor affecting who gets ahead
and who does not. The best chance
for securing a job that matches one's
skills and training is to be at the right
place at the right time. In thinking
about who ends up with what jobs,
Americans tend first to think about what
economists call the "supply side."
In labor economics, the supply side refers
to the pool of available workers to fill
jobs. The qualities of individual
workers and their suitability for
employment, however is only half of the
equation. The other half, the
"demand side" refers to the number and
types of jobs available. That is, what
kinds of jobs are available, how well do
they pay, and how many individuals are
seeking them? In recent decades, the
fastest growing segment of the American
labor force has been the lower white
collar service sector while there has been
a sharp drop in the higher paid
manufacturing and industrial sectors.
Although Americans are getting more
education, the economy is not producing
enough jobs with good pay, good
benefits, security and opportunities for
advancement commensurate with the
capacities of workers. A recent
Federal Reserve Study, for instance,
showed that in 2012 33% of all college
educated workers between 22 and 65 years
old held jobs that do not require a
college level degree; among more recent
graduates between 22 and 27, 44 % held
non-college level jobs and among the
most recent 22 year old graduates 56%
held non-college level jobs (Abel,
Deitz, and Su, 2014). These data
indicate that some college graduates who
are underemployed eventually move into
college level jobs but the demand side
is clearly not absorbing into college
level jobs all who are otherwise
qualified and that the gap is increasing
over time.
Beyond the prospects for income and
occupational success, being at the right
place at the right time also matters for
acquiring wealth. Indeed the
willingness to take chances and to risk
capital is the primary justification for
capitalism. If it would be
possible to predict the future with
certainty, there would be no risk.
Although defenders of merit often deny
or downplay the effects of luck,
striking it rich through inheritance,
entrepreneurial ventures, investments or
the lottery necessarily involves at
least some degree of just plain
luck. In short, the imperfections
and ultimate uncertainty of both the
stock market on Wall Street and the
labor market on Main Street add an
undeniable element of luck into the mix
of who "wins" and who "loses."
Discrimination
Finally, we also identify discrimination
as a non-merit factor. Indeed,
discrimination is not only a non-merit
factor, it is the antithesis of
merit. In addition to race and sex
discrimination which have the most
victims, we identify and document other
forms of discrimination including age
discrimination, religious
discrimination, discrimination based on
sexual identity and orientation,
non-work performance discrimination
against the disabled, and "lookism" or
preferential treatment of the
attractive. Lookism is an often
overlooked form of discrimination but
one that matters often in subtle but
substantial ways. Although
discrimination is down, it is not out.
The most public and overt forms of
discrimination have become socially
unacceptable, driving a significant
amount of the remaining
discrimination underground in more coded
or tacit forms but with equally
devastating effects. Even as some
forms of discrimination have been
reduced, the residue of prior
discrimination continues to reach into
the present both in the form of
cumulative costs of lost opportunity for
its victims and in the creation of
unequal starting points for successive
generations (Stainback and
Tomaskovic-Devey, 2012).
Recent Trends in
Inequality
Below I identify several trends that
have affected the dynamics of inequality
since the publication of the first
edition of The Meritocracy Myth.
The net effect of these trends has been
to reduce the capacities of individuals
to get ahead in America based on
individual merit alone and to further
solidify non-merit advantages for those
who are already privileged, especially
at the very top of the system where
income and wealth is highly
concentrated. If these trends
continue, America society may be moving
further away from Thomas Jefferson's
meritocratic vision for an American
society based on a "natural aristocracy
of talent and virtue" and increasingly
resembling a more feudal like system in
which sustained advantages at the very
top of the system perpetuate an economic
aristocracy of birth and privilege.
Increased
Economic Inequality
For
the past several decades, levels of
income and wealth inequality in the
United States have increased, especially
between the very wealthy and everyone
else. Federal Reserve data
show that the total share of all income
going to the top 5% of households
increased from 31% of the total in 1989
to 37% of the total in 2013 whereas the
income share of bottom half of
households decreased from 16% of the
total in 1989 to 14% of the total in
2013 (Yellen, 2014). Wealth disparities
have increased even more. The share of
all available wealth held by the
wealthiest 5% of households increased
from 54% in 1989 to 61% in 2013
whereas share of available wealth
held by the bottom half of all
households combined fell from just
3% in 1989 to only 1% in 2013
(Yellen, 2014). The increasing
concentration of income and wealth
toward the top of the system means that
it is even more difficult to move up in
the system based on merit alone. There
are two key reasons for this.
First, the distance between the bottom
of the system and the top increases so
that it becomes more difficult to close
the gap as the gap itself is
increasing. Second, already
privileged families at the top have more
resources available to pass on
advantages to future generations and to
insulate themselves from downward
mobility. Therefore, the
cumulative non-merit advantages
described above are further augmented
and solidified.
Globalization, De-industrialization,
and De-unionization
Immediately following the post-World War
II period, the United States easily
dominated world markets since most of
its pre-war industrial competitors had
much of their industrial capacity
damaged or destroyed. By the 1970s,
these countries, especially Japan and
Germany, had recovered and with U.S.
help had rebuilt with new and efficient
technologies and were emerging as
serious global competitors. In 1973, an
oil embargo imposed by the newly formed
Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) sharply increased
production costs, which was especially
detrimental to nations and industries
with the oldest and least efficient
production facilities. U.S. auto, steel,
textiles and chemicals industries—the
backbone of postwar industrial strength
were especially hard hit. Newly
emerging industrial powers especially
India, China, and South Korea added to
these global competitive
pressures. The combination of
increased costs of production and
increased foreign competition reduced
corporate profits. American
corporations responded to these new
competitive pressures through a variety
of strategies. Domestically,
factory production shifted away from the
urban industrial north-central and
northeastern parts of the United States
to locations in the South and Southwest
with lower wages, less unionization, and
less government regulation. To further
reduce production costs, corporations
aggressively shifted production and
technical support services abroad.
Millions of manufacturing jobs were
lost. New jobs were created but most of
these were in the "soft" low-wage,
low-skill, low unionized service sector
of the economy. The growth sector of the
American economy was being transformed
from auto, steel and oil to fast food,
day care, and shopping malls.
New communication technologies
accelerated the globalization of
markets. The trade deficit for the
United States dramatically increased as
imports exceeded exports, placing
downward pressure on domestic wages and
benefits. Under these conditions,
corporations often extracted wage and
benefit "concessions" and "givebacks"
from workers and moved to replace high
paid workers with outsourced contract
labor and dramatically increased
part-time, temporary, and contingent
labor, Corporations also aggressively
moved to break up existing unions and
prevent new ones from forming, further
reducing wages. Rates of
unionization have sharply fallen from
20.1 % of the labor force in 1983 to
11.3% in 2013 (U.S. Department of Labor,
2014). Under these conditions,
corporate profits and CEO pay sharply
increased while ordinary worker wages
stagnated or declined.
The
Financialization of Capital and the
Great Recession
At
the top of the pyramid chain of
corporate dominance in the U.S. economy
are big banks and other major financial
institutions such as insurance,
securities, credit, and mortgage
companies. This is the "paper
tiger" sector of the economy not
involved in the making or selling of
"things" but in moving money around;
that is, in the buying and selling of
money, credit, or financial risk.
As with other sectors of the U.S.
economy, the financial sector has become
increasingly consolidated. In
1970, the largest five U.S. banks held
17 percent of total industry assets; by
2010, the largest five U.S. banks held
52 percent of total industry assets
(Rosenblum 2011). This growing
level of consolidation along with
deregulation of the finance industry
contributed to a high risk "too big to
fail" environment in which a major
portion of the America economy was
controlled by a few large financial
entities operating under minimal
regulatory oversight. This
environment set the background for a
series of events that would trigger the
onset of The Great Recession in 2007.
Following the structural shifts in the
U.S. economy associated with
globalization and de-industrialization,
the U.S. economy was kept partially
afloat by the dot-com technology bubble
of the 1980s and 1990s which crashed in
2000. To help stimulate the economy, the
Federal Reserve reduced interest rates
(the cost to borrowers) to practically
zero. This meant that banks could
borrow money cheaply and get good return
by loaning it back out at even reduced
rates. The availability and low
cost of credit, especially for
mortgages, stimulated the housing market
and fueled a rapidly rising housing
bubble. The federal government had set
up a program to help low income families
become home owners and insured loans
against default and provided relaxed
rules for eligibility. These "sub-prime"
loans were then "packaged" and resold by
banks and financial institutions to
investors. Market confidence in
these securities eventually eroded and
the supply of credit was cut back.
Housing prices plummeted and huge
numbers of borrowers defaulted on their
mortgage loans. Banks and investment
companies were left holding huge sums of
these "toxic assets" for which they did
not have sufficient capital reserves to
cover the resulting losses. With banks
and investment companies unable to
absorb the losses, the economy as a
whole rapidly dipped into decline. The
federal government, itself deeply in
debt, reluctantly stepped in and bailed
out the credit market at a staggering
sum of over $700 billion.
All of these events had devastating
effects for workers, including increased
unemployment, stagnant wages, reduced
wealth, and increased debt.
Unemployment rates for instance, doubled
from the pre-recession level of 5% to
over 10% at the height of the recession.
Since 2009 the economy began to recover
but the recovery has been uneven.
Although the stock market largely
recovered by 2010 and since 2013 has
reached record highs, jobs and wages
have lagged behind. Unemployment rates
have very gradually receded to almost
pre-recession levels but wages remained
stagnant. Although the big banks
were largely bailed out, average
homeowners were not. In the
immediate aftermath of the financial
collapse, many homeowners were
"underwater" with their mortgages, owing
more on their homes than they were
worth. Housing prices have only
recently begun to recover but have not
yet reached pre-recession levels. This
is significant because for most wage
employees, the equity they have in their
homes is the greatest source of their
personal wealth. One of the main
reasons that the stock market has
recovered faster than jobs, wage income,
or housing prices is that investment
capital can move much more quickly than
labor. Investment capital, for
instance, can move rapidly around the
world wherever returns are greatest but
workers generally cannot either in terms
of jobs they hold or places they
live. In sum, the net effect of
the Great Recession has been increased
income and wealth inequality.
The Increasing
Marriage Gap
There has always been a strong tendency
for people to replicate their own social
profile in marriage. That is,
people tend to marry people of similar
age, race, education, religion, and
social class background. Several
observers have noted that the marriage
market in the United States is
increasingly consolidating by education
and social class (Carbone and Cahn,
2014; Rosenfeld, 2008; Schwartz and
Mare, 2005). Affluent men and women are
likely to meet potential marriage
partners in prestigious educational and
professional workplace settings where
they are likely to associate with people
like themselves. With delayed age
at first marriage, delayed time to start
families (until educations are complete
and careers established), and lower
birth rates among the wealthier,
affluent parents can and do invest much
more of their combined resources in
their children's futures than the less
affluent. Poor and working class
families, on the other hand, are much
less likely to be married in the first
place, much more likely to have children
early and outside of marriage, and
to experience familial disruption
through divorce—all of which have
adverse economic consequences (Carlson
and England, 2011).
Increasing Political Influence of the
Wealthy
In
the first edition of The Meritocracy
Myth, we identified one of the
characteristics of the upper class as
being politically powerful. In a pure
form democracy, everyone has an equal
say in the political process.
However, the reality is that those who
have more resources have more say so in
what happens. To the extent it is
possible to convert economic power into
political power, democracy is
compromised. The specific
mechanisms by which this influence is
exerted have been well documented (cf.
Domhoff, 2009 Gilens, 2012) and
include direct campaign contributions,
indirect funding through lobbying, think
tanks and policy groups, and ownership
of media outlets—all of which are
dominated by propertied interests. Much
of the influence exerted is subtle and
indirect ways such as insider access to
representatives. This is
significant in terms of the prospects
for meritocracy since the wealthy can
use their political influence to accrue
further advantage through governmental
policies including taxation, regulation,
and spending. To the extent that
propertied interests prevail, the system
gets further tilted in favor of the
already privileged enhancing the
cumulative effect of non-merit factors
that we identify. The extent of
money flowing into the American
political process has dramatically
increased in recent election cycles.
Moreover, an increasing share of this
funding is coming from Political Action
Committees and other outside groups with
a substantial portion of these outside
sources coming from "dark" money sources
or funding sources whose donors are not
disclosed. The increase in the
costs of campaigns means that if a
candidate cannot raise significant sums
they cannot stand for election in the
first place and that once elected,
elected officials end up spending an
increasing amount of their time raising
money for the next election cycle. The
capacity of the wealthy to influence the
political process was further enhanced
by the key decision in the 2010 Citizens
United vs. Federal Elections
Commission Supreme Court case
which now allows unlimited funding by
corporations and other organizational
entities to provide independent
political expenditures that support or
oppose candidates as long as there is no
direct connection or communication
to candidates or their campaign
organizations for which existing funding
limits still apply. These restrictions,
however, are often circumvented and do
not significantly lessen the ultimate
capacity of propertied interests to
disproportionately influence political
outcomes.
What Can Be Done?
During the long wage recession and
increasing economic inequality since the
1970s, Americans have resorted to a
variety of individual coping strategies
to try to make ends meet including both
spouses working, having fewer children,
working more hours, delaying retirement,
and borrowing more. Each of these
individual coping strategies have upper
limits which are quickly being
realized—there are only two spouses who
can work, fertility cannot be reduced
below zero, there are only 24 hours in a
day, retirement cannot be postponed
indefinitely, and a spiral of borrowing
and spending eventually results in
financial collapse. None of these
individual coping strategies will make
the system as a whole fairer or more
just. Changes of this magnitude
would require larger structural changes
in the organization of society as whole.
In the first edition, we identified
several reforms that could make the
system operate more closely to
meritocratic principles that Americans
in principle endorse. These
include reducing current forms of
discrimination, pursuing affirmative
action to address the residual effects
of past discrimination, redistributing
wealth through philanthropy, adopting a
more genuinely progressive tax system,
and directing government spending toward
creating greater opportunity of those
toward the bottom of the system.
Although some progress has been made on
these fronts in the ten years since the
publication of the first edition, the
system as a whole has not fundamentally
become more meritocratic.
Overt discrimination continues to
decline in society as a whole, although
the lingering residual effects created
by past discrimination continue to have
effects in the present, especially with
regard to unequal starting points across
generations of those affected.
Race based affirmative action policies
designed to address the issue of unequal
starting points have been increasingly
restricted by the courts in recent
years. Currently, race may still be
considered a factor in promoting the
goal of diversity, for instance, in
college admissions process. However,
problems of identifying racial
categories and decoupling race from
class disadvantage may ultimately
eliminate any form of race based
affirmative action which may or may not
be replaced with various forms of class
based affirmative action.
With respect to philanthropy, several
prominent top wealth holders including
Bill Gates, Warren Buffett and Mark
Zuckerberg have pledged to eventually
give the bulk of their accumulated
fortunes to charity. This
practice, which is becoming more common
among the very wealthy, at least
potentially slows down a cycle
intergenerational transmission of wealth
at the very top of the system. Despite
these prominent examples, however, the
vast bulk of accumulated familial wealth
is still transferred
intergenerationally. Besides
reducing wealth accumulation at the top,
philanthropy has at least the potential
to simultaneously increase opportunity
for those at the bottom, depending on
both the amounts donated and how those
charitable dollars are spent. While the
sums donated to philanthropic causes are
often significant in terms of the total
amounts donated, on scale they are not
sufficiently large enough to
fundamentally change the overall extent
of inequality in society. Moreover, a
large portion of these philanthropic
donations go to religious organizations,
hospitals and medical research,
universities, the arts and other such
activities which while doing much good
in society are not targeted directly to
creating greater opportunity for the
less affluent.
With respect to taxes, as part of a
fiscal deal in 2013 to avoid a
government showdown the nominal top
federal income tax rate (before
deductions, exclusions, and other
loopholes) increased slightly from 35%
to 39.5% for incomes over $400,000 if
single and $450,000 for couples. The
effective tax rate (the rate actually
paid) is typically much lower.
Recent data from the Internal Revenue
Service, for instance, show that in 2010
the 400 taxpayers with the highest
incomes in the U.S. paid an effective
average federal income rate of 18.04%
(IRS, 2014). Also in 2013, the
thresholds for exemption from estate
tax, the primary means of taxing the
transfer wealth across generations, were
significantly raised so that only
estates over $5.12 million for
individuals and over $10 million for
couples are subject to federal estate
tax, which exempts almost all but a tiny
proportion of all estates. The
United States continues to be an overall
low tax country compared to other
advanced industrial societies and at
best only modestly progressive.
One major form of government spending
that has been instituted since the first
edition is the Affordable Care Act of
2010 which was established to provide
health insurance at subsidized rates to
low income individuals and families,
especially targeted at segments of the
population who previously were
uninsured. Other reforms include
eliminating life-long caps on insurance
coverage and eliminating exemptions for
those with preexisting health
conditions. This type of government
subsidy and reform helps to create the
potential for more opportunity for
individuals and families who could not
otherwise invest in getting ahead if
they were financially burdened by
medical illness or injury. Conservative
political opposition to the Affordable
Care Act, however, has been robust and
the future viability of the program
remains uncertain. Further
government investments in education and
job creation in particular could help
create more opportunity especially if
targeted to those furthest behind in the
race to get ahead. Concern about
government spending and the role of
government in such activity, however,
remains strong.
In the third edition of The
Meritocracy Myth, we added two
other possible means of closing the
inequality gap and establishing a more
meritocratic system. One way is to
focus on asset accumulation for low
income groups (Conley 1999, Shapiro
2004). To lack capital in a
capitalist society is to be at a severe
economic and social disadvantage. In
short, it often takes money to make
money, even for those relying otherwise
on just meritocratic potential. Asset
building policies targeted at those of
modest means such as government
assistance for home purchases or
starting and expanding businesses as
well as tax incentives to encourage
savings and investments could help
stimulate wealth creation at the bottom
of the system. Such policies,
however, would require both seed money
to establish and the political will to
do so.
Another possibility for reform might be
a resurgence of the labor movement or a
poor people's movement that would bring
greater attention to the increasing
inequality gap and unequal starting
points in the race to get ahead. The
Occupy Wall Street movement started in
2011 at the height of the Great
Recession is one example of this kind of
reform movement. Although the movement
itself quickly dissipated, it did bring
national attention to the concentration
of wealth among the top 1% with its
often repeated "We are the 99%" slogan.
If inequality continues to increase
along with greater public awareness,
similar grassroots movements are likely
to emerge.
In addition to the reforms noted above,
in the third edition we contend that
reforms in the organization of economic
and political institutions could
decrease inequality and create more
equitable conditions in society.
Corporations could be reformed in such a
way as to make them more politically
accountable and more socially
responsible with greater government
regulation and oversight in the public's
interest. Political
institutions could also be reformed in
ways that would make them more genuinely
democratic and responsive to the needs
of its citizens. Chief among such
reforms would be reducing the influence
of money in politics.
Finally, we contend that exposing and
debunking the meritocracy myth is in
itself an important reform. It is
important because the myth of
meritocracy provides an incomplete
explanation for success and failure that
mistakenly exalts the rich and condemns
the poor. In addition to merit
factors that are at work, we also need
to recognize that inheritance, luck,
discrimination and a variety of other
circumstances beyond the immediate
control of individuals are important
determinants of where one ends up in the
system. Our conclusion remains the
same as ten years ago: We may
always have the rich and poor among us,
but we need neither exalt the former nor
condemn the latter.
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