Sociation Today

Building Consensus in Contested Spaces: Lessons for Post-Ferguson America from Inner-City Boston

by

Geniece Crawford

Wingate University

In the United States of America the relationship between law enforcement and marginalized communities has long been fraught with tension and suspicion. The iconic images of officers siccing police canines on Civil Rights protesters highlight the corrupting power of the State when citizens' constitutional rights are disregarded. In this current moment in police-community relations the national conscience is yet again gripped by images of violent encounters between representatives of the State and her citizenry. Post-Ferguson America, (1) as some pundits have termed this period in race relations, is one in which police shootings of unarmed African American men and women have transformed the national conversation around crime, law enforcement and social protest (Clay 2015). From Ferguson to Chicago, New York City to Cleveland, the signature question community residents, academicians and those charged with serving and protecting much grapple with in 2016 is not unlike the question once raised by Dr. Martin Luther King: Where do we go from here? (King 2010). In this paper I hope to examine one element of this question by de-constructing the consensus building process between law enforcement and community members in the city of Boston. Using a theoretical framework which outlines the role of deliberation and agreement, I examine how law enforcement and community members negotiate competing notions of justice.

Deliberation and Consensus

Drawing upon a diverse set of reform initiatives, Fung and Wright (2001) conceptualize a deliberative model of democracy they refer to as Empowered Deliberative Democracy (EDD). According to the authors, each of the reform initiatives in their study met the criteria of EDD because they share the following features: 1) They have the potential to be radically democratic by using ordinary people 2) Instituted reason-based decision making 3) Attempted to connect discussion to action. The authors contend that genuine deliberation is not based upon the endorsement of every individual involved in the process. Rather, participants seek to find common areas of agreement that enable them to accept the final decision. Still, there remains the possibility that decisions will be a product of power-plays, intimidation or suppression, all of which contradict genuine consensus.

The assumption that participants are able to discern the difference between genuine deliberation and disingenuous posturing is a reasonable one if participants possess sufficient knowledge about each other and about the issue under discussion. However, in settings in which individuals assemble to discuss an issue they know little about, it may be difficult to make the distinction Fung and Wright assume. Furthermore, the distinction Fung and Wright draw between genuine deliberation and disingenuous posturing seems to suggest that the two do not occur simultaneously. However, one might consider a situation in which an individual with considerable power neither manipulates others nor uses their position to advance personal interests, but is still able to have considerable influence on the final decision.

Policy analysts Hajer and Wagenaar (2003) push the boundaries of contemporary analyses of democratic decision-making by attending to the kind of unstructured ad-hoc initiatives left unexamined by Fung and Wright (2001). The authors apply an interpretive approach to policy analysis which examines the "…open-ended, often unusual, ad hoc arrangements that demonstrate remarkable problem-solving capacity and open up opportunities for learning and change in exactly those circumstances where classical-modernist institutions have failed to deliver" (p.3). In outlining the five issues addressed by the interpretive analytic approach, Hajer and Wagenaar (2003) call attention to: (1) New spaces of politics in which individual responsibility, authority and accountability is not predetermined (2) Policy and policymaking under radical uncertainty that occurs when constituents possess a lack of faith in formal institutions (3) Importance of difference (4) Awareness of interdependence among groups and (5) Dynamics of trust and identity. The first and second points address how power is distributed in settings where positions of authority are not previously established. Questions regarding the legitimacy or influence of an individual's or group's contribution also arise in these ambiguous settings. The remaining points address the ability of actors to collaborate, while acknowledging their differences. The authors go on to explain that collaboration across groups is only made possible through the trust established during the decision making process. As a result, the decision-making process is not only about finding solutions and designing policy but "… about finding formats that generate trust among mutually interdependent actors" (p.12). The common thread running through each of the questions raised thus far is the relationship between structure and action.

These studies bring to the fore the extent to which the structure of initiatives, institutional settings and meetings shape inter-group dynamics, discussions and decisions. Hajer and Wagenaar (2003) emphasize the complex and often messy nature of these social arrangements, but leave room for further analysis. For example, there needs to be greater attention to the role of leadership in these unstructured, ad-hoc settings and an examination of how leadership, or a lack thereof frames debates and social issues. Drawing upon the interactionist tradition of sociology, this paper hopes to fill the conceptual gaps identified in the theoretical frameworks discussed.

Conceptualizing Consensus in Contested Space

    In The Presentation of Self in Every Day Life, Goffman (1959) posits that consensus occurs when individuals suppress their beliefs in order to create a publicly shared understanding of a situation or an event. The shared understanding that results creates a "surface agreement" or a "veneer of consensus" which reflects, at the very least, the general areas of agreement among actors. (2) This view of consensus differs drastically from the model presented by Fung and Wright (2001). While they and other political theorists describe a deliberative process that involves open and forthright discussion , Goffman (1959) describes a process that involves self-censoring and suppression (Mansbridge 1983; Fung and Wright 2001).

     According to Goffman, veneers of consensus allow actors who hold diverse views in order to create the appearance of collective agreement. By contrast, the definition of consensus outlined by political theorists implies that without genuine deliberation and mutual respect between actors any attempt to build consensus breaks down. This understanding of consensus, however, fails to take into account the instances in which actors possess opposing views and opt for a veneer of consensus rather than an unresolved stalemate. One obvious critique of Goffman is that what he defines as consensus is nothing more than a publicly shared lie. However, Goffman's description of consensus is not an attempt to outline consensus in its most ideal form. Rather, Goffman describes what commonly occurs in real world settings.

     Consensus, therefore, should not be thought of as an absolute but as existing in varying degrees. For example, consensus which exists in its most genuine form would consist of a publically shared view that individual actors support privately. A veneer of consensus or surface agreement occurs when the publicly shared understanding of a situation is not held by individual members of the group. At this point one may ask: Why and under what circumstances do individuals choose to support or challenge a surface agreement? This question addresses the second point to be addressed in this analysis.

     Expanding upon Goffman's analysis Winship (2004) examines how contextual factors transform surface level agreements. Winship (2004) asserts that in order to understand how individuals make sense of others' actions one must take into account the values, beliefs and knowledge held by actors and groups. These beliefs or "underlayments" are necessary to understand how individuals arrive at decisions and jointly define situations.

     The socio-historical context of Boston at the time of the proposed initiative was one in which racial tensions were both mended and fragile. While discussion of the crime initiative was, on the surface, about best practices for the city's predominately African American community, it became clear that historical injustices and deep seated distrust of law enforcement formed the subtext for deliberation. In such an environment I ask:

What constitutes consensus building for those on the margins of society?
How do law enforcement and community collaborators understand and frame consensus?
Under what circumstances are surface agreements created, defined and/or deconstructed?

Race, Crime and Restoration: The Boston Context

During the late 1980s and early 1990s the city of Boston's police-community relations reached a seemingly insurmountable nadir. After years of forced school busing interracial tensions in Boston were at an all-time high. Moreover, Boston experienced a steep rise in crime due to a thriving crack cocaine market (Winship 2004). With the expansion of the underground economy violence between rival gangs increased, as groups fought to retain control over the most profitable areas of the city. In an effort to address burgeoning criminal activity, the Boston Police Department adopted a "stop and frisk" strategy. Unsurprisingly, this approach was met with resistance by predominantly black communities, further straining the relationship between minority communities and the police department.

     The events that occurred on May 14, 1992, precipitated a series of events that would ultimately reshape the then damaged relationships between law enforcement and Boston's African American community. During the funeral of 20-year old Robert Odom, a group of young men entered the sanctuary of Boston's Morningstar Baptist Church and violently attacked one of the attendees (Winship and Berrien 1999; Berrien and Winship 2002). For many, this incident provided irrefutable proof that the crime epidemic of the 1990s had crossed a sacred line. In particular, it became clear to a group of black ministers that youth violence would continue to increase without intervention from the city's leaders. Convinced that the city's youth would be lost to violence, these ministers formed the Ten Point Coalition. The ministers adopted a hands-on approach to working with local youth that entailed adopting local gangs and conducting Friday night patrols throughout the city's most troubled areas.

     In addition to police-community leader partnerships crime reduction initiatives such as Operation Ceasefire helped to dramatically decrease the crime rate in Boston. Beginning in the spring of 1996, Operation Ceasefire was an interagency effort involving a number of law enforcement agencies around the city (Braga et al. 2001). One of Operation Ceasefire's most effective strategies was the use of a "pulling levers" approach, a zero-tolerance policy for illicit activity that was coupled with providing social services. (Kennedy 1997; Kennedy 2006). Not only did Operation Ceasefire contribute to a sixty-three percent drop in the city's monthly homicide rate, but unlike other major cities, police-community relations were strengthened in the process (Berrien and Winship 1999).

     Berrien and Winship (1999), in their analysis of Boston police-community collaboration, find that Boston's success story was largely due to the development of healthy relationships between the black community and the Boston Police Department. The willingness of black clergy, one of the most respected groups in the African American community, to collaborate with officers provided the Boston Police Department with an "umbrella of legitimacy" (Berrien et al 2000; Berrien and Winship 2002). According to Berrien et al. (2000), ministers involved in the Ten Point Coalition were able to shield the police department from the kind of scrutiny and public disapproval that previously characterized their relationship with the black community. More specifically, black clergy were effective in legitimizing the police department when officers dealt with youth in a fair and just manner, cooperated with the community and ministers and when they targeted the city's most troubled youth. However, in situations in which the actions of officers went beyond the boundaries of acceptable behavior outspoken members of the Ten Point Coalition would publically criticize the police department's actions.

    Though largely responsible for the decline in criminal activity, organizational changes in the Boston Police Department and budgetary constraints ultimately led to the end of Operation Ceasefire (Braga et al 2008). In addition to these changes, the Ten Point Coalition experienced major organizational shifts in the years following the end of Ceasefire. Along with the increased publicity of the organization came inter-personal tensions among the ministers, especially surrounding decisions affecting the organization's structure. Unfortunately, the community leaders most responsible for laying the foundation for the Boston Miracle were unable to work together to address the rise in violence over the past decade.

The Safe Homes Initiative (SHI)

     It is against this socio-historical backdrop that in November of 2007, Edward Davis, the then police commissioner of the Boston Police Department unveiled Safe Homes, a consent-to-search initiative. The Safe Homes Initiative (SHI) was modeled after a consent-to-search program developed for St. Louis, MO in the mid-1990s. The high success rate of the St. Louis program (510 recovered guns over an 18 month period) and the cooperation of St. Louis residents (98 percent of parents allowed the search), were the guiding impetus for the Boston Police Department's implementation of the Safe Homes Initiative.

     The target communities for the initiative-- Egleston Square, Franklin Field, Grove Hall and the Bowdoin and Geneva area of Dorchester—were majority minority communities with some of Boston's highest violent crime rates. Searches were conducted once plain clothed police officers, accompanied by local community leaders or clergy, approached homes they identified based on referrals from community members, families or school officials concerned that a juvenile was in possession of an illegal gun. Searches were performed only after receiving the signed consent of the juvenile's guardian. Moreover, families received the promise that if a gun was recovered the juvenile would not be prosecuted with illegal gun possession. (3) The program was also monitored by a community advisory council comprised of clergy, academics, residents, affiliates of the Boston Housing Authority (BHA) and various other community leaders (Braga and Brown 2007).

     Almost immediately the program received both praise and harsh criticism from community leaders, residents and politicians. Echoing the sentiment expressed by Commissioner Davis, supporters felt that Safe Homes was a positive step in alleviating the fear and frustration experienced by overburdened parents, particularly single mothers (Cramer, 2008a). Opponents, however, saw the program as a gross breach of civil rights and a hindrance to improving police-community relations (Cramer, 2008b).

Settings and Methods

The data for this study was collected between the Fall of 2007 to the spring of 2009. I engaged in participant observation, by attending local town hall meetings and conducted fourteen in depth interviews. Three of the respondents were politicians and the remaining eleven were community organizers. In addition to interviews and observation, local newspaper articles were analyzed to examine the extent to which media framed the initiative favorably or unfavorably.

Interviews and field notes were coded based on themes that emerged from. Themes were then organized and grouped based on how respondents framed both the initiative under analysis and their views on the community, law enforcement and their role in social issues. The names and organizational affiliations of interviewees have been changed to protect the privacy of respondents.

Meeting at the Table: Defining Goals and Objectives

      With the exception of a few community leaders, participants in SHI town hall meetings were not engaged in the process of creating the initial version of the initiative. Therefore, town hall meetings were framed as an opportunity to discuss the existing program developed by the Boston Police Department. As a consequence, many participants approached discussions of the program from the position of critic rather than that of a collaborator. Although the organizer of the town hall meetings, Tyrone Jameson, claimed that meetings would address both the drawbacks and benefits of the program, the meetings were clearly biased against the program. Tyrone, a member of a local Black Nationalist organization in Boston, was a well-known critic of law enforcement and did not hide that fact throughout meeting proceedings. For example, Tyrone selected panelists who were opposed to the initiative or, at best, ambivalent about the police department's intentions. His open hostility towards the initiative not only influenced who led the discussion, but also how police-community relations were framed during meetings.

     By the middle of the first town hall meeting it was apparent that the vast majority of speakers were opposed the Boston Police Department's latest program to combat youth violence. The six panelists for the evening's discussion included John Vera, an attorney for the a non-profit based in Washington D.C., Elizabeth Clinton, a local law professor, Rebecca Smith, the president of local law enforcement organization for minority police, Eliza Jacobs, a professor at another local law school, Jelani Thomas, a local community organizer and Tanya Crawley, the project coordinator for community based program hosted by one of the local universities. The purpose of the panel discussion was to provide community residents with expert based views of the SHI. However, speakers would often discuss issues which fell beyond the scope of the initiative and discuss other issues facing the community. For example, Elizabeth Clinton, a specialist in juvenile law, felt that the program targeted the wrong demographic (juveniles) and ignored the importance of social and economic resources. Her comments were not so much centered on critiquing the design of the SHI, but rather on the fact that there were more important issues facing the city than guns owned by minors. The attention to underlying causes of youth violence, was also illustrated in the comments of other community leaders.

      Another panelist, Jelani Thomas, drew historical connections between the perceived oppressive undertones of the SHI and the oppressive nature of slavery. For him, the history of poor race relations between whites and minority groups, as illustrated by the system of mass enslavement, was an underlying justification for opposing the initiative. Like Mr. Thomas, City Councilor Phil Jenkins also drew connections between contemporary black America and slavery. While he acknowledged the social progress blacks achieved since the enslavement of Africans, he challenged audience members to recognize the problems still facing the black community. The SHI, he argued, was a misguided program which would hinder much needed progress. What Councilor Jenkins and other speakers seemed to understand was that for residents of Boston's high-risk communities it was difficult to critique the SHI without linking it to the broader social, historical and cultural experiences of black Americans. In a private interview with the city councilor he framed the initiative as one illustration of historical injustice. When asked to discuss his perspective on police-community relations in Boston he states:

They're very, very bad. You know there's a history of I'd say, generally, a negative relationship. You know, the police department is controlled by the Irish. And I think, given the Irish history of fighting against the Yankee oppression, that we've kind of gotten caught up in that. And so, I think the Irish police force has acted as kind of a pressing force in the communities over time. But that's not different from other cities, so it's just I think our experience is like the experience of people in other urban areas, that the department has tended to be more of an oppressive, coercive force… So I think we've moved away from community policing as it was conceived of in the media in the '80s. And, as witnessed by the Safe Home Initiative, I think there's a-- you know, a lack of sensitivity, even by people, by the leadership, in terms of policing initiatives. Plus, I think this Safe Home program is being touted as a way of the police department working with the community. But it's clear that people have a lot of negative reactions to it.

The city councilor's comments convey both a sense of frustration and anger, not simply with the SHI, but with the overall treatment of minority communities at the hands of police. Extending his critique beyond the city of Boston, he claims that the systemic oppression of individuals in urban communities is rooted in a long history of racism and nationalism. The focus on past injustices and contemporary concerns not directly related to the SHI, created the sense that the SHI meetings provided a platform for leaders and residents to address the persistent needs of the community. In other words, the SHI meetings can be viewed as "surface events" that allowed individuals to discuss the issues they identified as the underlying causes of inequality.

A casual observer of the first town hall meeting might conclude that the black community was unanimously opposed to the program. The focus on issues unrelated to the Safe Homes Initiative, such as historical racism, turned a meeting that should have centered on crime strategies into a contest between the black community and the police department. For the "framers" of the first town hall meeting like Tyrone and the panelists, the attention on the BPD's flaws, racial injustice and the city's failures with respect to Boston youth, helped to create the veneer of consensus that Safe Homes was unwanted by the vast majority of Boston's minority community.

Structuring Dissent

     Like the first town hall meeting, the second town hall meeting framed the initiative negatively within the first half hour. Tyrone began the meeting by reading a published statement by Deputy Lieutenant Gary French, the police official largely responsible for promoting the initiative. Tyrone then told the audience that French's positive comments about the program were misleading. The evening's panel included five individuals, four or whom where opposed to the program. Rebecca Smith and Prof. Clinton of Northeastern were returning panelists. The panel also included Angela Heels, an attorney with the ACLU, Lincoln Biggs, a local community activist and Malcolm Hameed, a community activist and former gang member. Mr. Hameed was also the only supporter of the program.

      The most significant difference between the first and second meeting had little to do with the change in content, but rather with the change in structure. Due to the time constraints of the previous meeting, Tyrone chose to organize the meeting around the views of panelists and other community leaders. The interactions which resulted from the change in structure demonstrated that while residents appreciated the attention community organizers, elected officials and other speakers devoted to the community's social problems, they too desired to contribute to the discussion.

     Although less organized, the structure of the first town hall meeting allowed for more dialogue between community residents and speakers. Community residents were also given the opportunity to address the audience, offering their perspective on the initiative and other community concerns. According to Tyrone, implementing a tighter structure in the second meeting would ensure that comments would be focused around the SHI, rather than on other community issues. For residents, however, the meeting's structure placed them in a position of spectators, rather than active participants in the deliberative process. This proved to be a point of frustration for residents and turned attention away from the SHI and toward the differences between residents and organizers.

     Residents' reaction to the structured form of the second meeting and even their overall sentiment toward the SHI illustrated their sincere desire to maintain a sense of ownership and responsibility over their community. Therefore by limiting residents' participation, even in the interest of maintaining order, opponents like Tyrone placed the existing surface agreement in jeopardy. The meeting also illustrated the broader challenge community organizers face in managing the delicate balance between their roles as discussion facilitators and community representatives. During the first meeting it was clear that organizers' ability to use the meeting as a surface event to discuss underlying concerns allowed them to better identify with residents and thus construct a veneer of consensus around the SHI. By contrast, the second meeting demonstrated that community organizers were also expected to facilitate dialogue between leaders and residents. Exchanges between residents and organizers illustrated that limiting the ability of residents to participate in the deliberative process could actually challenge the legitimacy of the proceedings, the authority of organizers and upend shared agreemnts established previously.

Silent Minority?

The events at the town hall meetings illustrate that a few vocal voices can play a large role in creating a surface agreement. The meetings also illustrate that the silence of those in support of the initiative may also play a role in shaping the veneer of consensus. Through interviews with community leaders, it was apparent that not all shared the existing surface agreement that the SHI would negatively impact minorities. While some did not publicly express their views, there were those who did. According to them, their ability to challenge what they perceived as the existing surface agreement was not always well received.

There was also a sense among some of the respondents that there was more support for the SHI within the community than comments at the town hall meetings indicated. This view was expressed by one of the few politicians who expressed support for the program during the first town hall meeting. When asked whether or not he felt such a controversial program could be effective he states:

Yeah. I think it will. I think it will. Because actually, I think my feeling---my take on that meeting in the community is that the community is, without saying so explicitly, kind of opening up. There is more openness to this than they would even like to admit. This became an opportunity to talk about lots of issues in the community.

This city councilor suggests that attendees at the meeting were reluctant to express their support of the program. As a result, opposition against the SHI appeared to be the unanimous view of the African American community.

The second town hall meeting further illustrated how the veneer of consensus was partially constructed by "silent" supporters. During the meeting community activist Malcolm Hameed engaged in a heated exchange with one of the audience members about the structure of the program. This was likely due to the fact that Hameed, the only supporter of the program, did not present a strong case for the Safe Homes program. While he encouraged the audience to remain open to the program, he stopped just short of fully endorsing the program. In other settings, such as interviews with the local press, Hameed openly supported the program (Cramer 2008d). At the meeting, however, he failed to convey this message which likely contributed to reinforcing the existing veneer of consensus.

Legitimate Leadership

Those in positions of authority play a significant role in creating, reinforcing and deconstructing a surface agreement. It is surprising, then, that a group once at the forefront of developing community-police crime strategies remained relatively quiet during the debates surrounding the Safe Homes Initiative. In examining the role of those in leadership in constructing surface agreements, it is worthwhile to explore the significance of black ministers in the Safe Homes debate. Some community leaders viewed the BPD's decision to allow ministers to accompany plain clothed officers to homes as a misguided attempt to allay the fears of residents. Liz Thompson, the founder of a community peace institute, questioned the practicality of black ministers accompanying officers. In expressing these sentiments she states:

…You know, the police has a tendency of relying on a group of black ministers. You know? Not all, not the entire community is black. One of the things we're pushing also is looking at the diverse culture of our community. Not all families are Baptist.

Georgette Braxton, another woman heavily invested in a high risk community, sheds light on the limitations of the black clergy.

Unlike the other community organizers interviewed, Georgette was not a part of an organization formally designed to meet the needs of the community. She was a business owner in one of the most dangerous areas of Boston. The following is an excerpt from field notes collected during my conversation with Georgette.

Towards the end of our conversation Georgette discusses the traditional role of the Black Church within the black community. She says that because the church has traditionally been the center of the Black community whites learned that in order to reach blacks they had to reach the Church. She complains that Blacks have not learned to move beyond the church. In expressing this sentiment she says that members of the black community cannot "piss in a pot" without getting permission from the Church. When she mentioned to community members that she wanted to start a civic association she was told that she needed to first call the Church. The incident made her frustrated because whites were able to form organizations without the backing of their religious institutions but blacks continued to rely upon support from the Church. She explains this pattern by arguing that blacks were are not "open- eyed enough to change their methodology."

For her, the assumption that clergy was the most qualified group to negotiate police-community relations constrained rather than expanded opportunities to solve social problems. Braxton and Thompson were not alone in their views on the role of the black clergy in the community. During the first town hall meeting on the SHI, Senator Wilson questioned the involvement of ministers in crime fighting strategies. Like Braxton, she expressed her personal belief in Christian teachings, as well as her regular attendance at predominantly black church in Boston. Her disapproval therefore was not based upon the legitimacy of the Christian faith, but the efficacy, or lack thereof, of faith-based approaches to combating crime.

One of the first organizations to condemn the SHI was the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). (4) Citing the SHI's disregard for constitutional rights, the ACLU blasted the BPD for its insensitivity towards the city's minority communities. Despite the ACLU's open hostility towards the initiative, one of the organization's attorneys indicated that the organization was ill equipped to voice the interests of community members. A month prior to the first SHI town hall meeting, Ms. Sandra Grossman, an attorney with the ACLU, informed me that neither she nor the organization were in a position to tell community members that the initiative should be stopped.

At the heart of Ms. Grossman's concerns is the issue of legitimacy. Although the ACLU's overall disapproval of the SHI appeared to resonate with community members attending the meetings, they were community outsiders. One longtime community organizer, clergyman and supporter of the SHI felt that the ACLU's outsider status disqualified them from being legitimate critics. When asked to state his views on SHI opponents he states the following:

…I'm tired of these elitist, disconnected organizations coming and swooping in when they think that there's been a rule violation and trying to make it right. And we have to follow what they have to do. I said, "They have absolutely no idea of the experiences, the day to day experiences, of mothers, and aunts, and uncles, and fathers, and grandparents who have to deal with this violence every day…I'm like, "Until you've experienced that daily, don't come up in here talking about, 'This is a violation of Constitutional rights.'" …I'm like, "Where do you come off coming in here and not even trying to understand? …And then the other thing is that the whole premise is that you cannot minimize individual rights for the sake of public safety. Then what do you call 9/11? What do you call the Patriot Act?... All of a sudden, you guys are quiet, when it comes to this kind of stuff. But yet we've got our own brand of crisis of violence in our neighborhoods, and we're trying to figure out ways to combat it, and you want to come in and say, "It's violation of individual rights." I'm like, please!

For this respondent, it was not the ACLU's position on the SHI that drove his frustration. As a seasoned community organizer, he was accustomed to the challenges and opposition associated with community work. His main problem with the ACLU was their attempt to advocate for individuals with whom they lacked relationships. In light of this observation one may question whether or not the ACLU'S outsider status truly affected the trajectory of the initiative. While addressing this question falls beyond the scope of this analysis, it does shed light on an important aspect of the consensus building process. Individuals, groups and institutions may share the same view on an issue but may lack the wherewithal to develop a clear and unified approach to addressing it. The ACLU possessed the resources and manpower necessary to distribute information to community residents, but lacked the relationships necessary to legitimize their efforts. A similar problem faced another ardent opponent of the SHI, Tyrone Jameson.

Conclusion: Winners, Losers and a
Goffmanian Approach to Public Policy Analysis

     After months of heated debates, forums, community meetings and postponements the Boston Police Department launched the Safe Homes Initiative in March of 2008 (Cramer, 2008e). By March the program underwent significant modifications. Initially slated to target four communities--Egleston Square, Franklin Hill and Franklin Field, Geneva Avenue and Bowdoin Street and Grove Hall—the final version of the program would only target Egleston Square. Despite this significant change to the program, opponents like Tyrone, were unwilling to accept the program. Shortly following the launching of the program he organized an anti-Safe Homes protest at the Boston Police Department's headquarters. (5) After publicizing the protest throughout Boston's black communities and local schools Tyrone expected a large showing of residents. Instead, the gathering consisted of approximately twenty elementary school age children and ten adults. Within the town hall meetings Tyrone was able to control who spoke and when they spoke. Yet in this last attempt to rally the black community beyond the confines of a meeting hall, his efforts appeared to be unsuccessful. For months he told the media that the black community did not want the program, yet the meager showing of adults at the protest failed to substantiate his claims. Although Tyrone managed to gain city-wide publicity and organize lively community meetings, in the end he was unable to pose a genuine threat to the police department's initiative.

      While there are not always clear winners or losers in deliberative settings, evaluating their outcomes can provide insight into the role of surface agreements in changing local politics. The outcome of the Safe Homes Initiative provides a clear illustration of this point. (6) In March of 2008 the police finally launched Safe Homes in Egleston Square. Aside from Tyrone's failed attempt at a rally, there was little protest from the black community. Still, the outcome of the initiative illustrates that opponents both won and lost in their fight to block the initiative. Substantively, opponents were successful in their attempt to change the design of the initiative. While individuals like Tyrone's or organizations like the ACLU may have been unsatisfied with the changes, the outcry from the community was significant enough to change the police department's approach. Politically, however, opponents lost in their battle to demonstrate their credibility as authorities on the black community. The police department, by contrast, was able to save face politically because they were able to continue the program, albeit in a significantly altered form.

      This paper has attempted to illustrate the how consensus is constructed and falls apart in contested spaces. While this analysis builds upon the body of deliberative scholarship produced by political theorists, it provides a theoretical approach for studying consensus that differs from preexisting models. The criteria for consensus should not be based solely upon the expressed views of a vocal minority or even the widely shared views of the majority. The student of deliberative practices must ask: What are the underlying elements that may hinder consensus? How does context or leadership play a role in creating a sense of consensus? In the case of the Safe Homes Initiative racial injustice was a prominent underlying factor that formed the basis of opponents' criticism of both the initiative and law enforcement. It is therefore imperative that police-community initiatives not only address initiatives and reforms at face value, but also attend to pre-existing tensions that may impede dialogue and collaboration. Although this study focused on a local crime initiative, the approach used in this analysis may have implications for other police-community initiatives. The mid-scale reforms examined by Fung and Wright (2001), for example, could prove to be rich sites for testing Goffman's conceptualization of consensus.

     This study, though insightful, is not without its limitations. The data used to describe surface agreement construction in the Safe Homes is based primarily on the views of opponents of the initiatives. Incorporating the perspectives of more supporters and community residents would likely present a more nuanced representation of the deliberative process.   Secondly, the unstructured form of the Safe Homes Initiative likely differs considerably from structured initiatives in which previously established rules of deliberation frame conversations and debates. This limitation, however, demonstrates the need for more studies examining the kind of "…open-ended, often unusual, ad hoc arrangements…" that occur in inner-city communities throughout the country (Hajer and Wagenaar 3). Perhaps the most notable contemporary example of an "ad hoc" protest movement is the Black Lives Matter movement. Such movements may begin in an unstructured fashion, using social media outlets as a means to galvanize supporters, but over time they may develop a clearer leadership and mobilization structure. How these actors and law enforcement engage with one another can either lead to productive consensus or exacerbate existing tensions.

Footnotes

(1) Post-Ferguson refers to the period of time following the shooting of Michael Brown on August 19, 2014. The protests that erupted after the shooting is cited as a pivotal moment in how communities respond to police shootings of unarmed suspects.

(2) The terms "veneer of consensus" and "surface agreements" will be used interchangeably in the paper.

(3) If the gun was traced to a homicide or the police found other illicit items (i.e. large quantity of drugs) they youth may then be charged. The decision to charge the youth with such a crime was left to the discretion of the officer.

(4) Shortly after the BPD announced the program, the ACLU distributed fliers warning community members about the risks associated with warrantless searches.

(5) Details of the protest are based upon an account from an informant who observed the protest.

(6) I choose to focus on the Safe Homes initiative because the clear distinction between supporters and opponents allows me to better illustrate how "winners" and "losers" can belong to either side of the debate.

References

Bay State Banner. 2008. "ACLU Skeptical of Police Warrantless Search Plan", November 11, Retrieved January 23, 2008.
(http://www.baystatebanner.com/issues/
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Beetham, David. 1991. The Legitimation of Power. NJ: Humanities Press International.

Berrien, Jenny and Christopher Winship. 1999. "Lessons Learned from Boston's Police-Community Collaboration" Federal Probation. 63: 25-32.

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