The Official Journal of The North Carolina Sociological Association: A Peer-Reviewed Refereed Web-Based Publication ISSN 1542-6300 Editorial Board: Editor: George H. Conklin, North Carolina Central University Board: Rebecca Adams, UNC-Greensboro Bob Davis, North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University Catherine Harris, Wake Forest University Ella Keller, Fayetteville State University Ken Land, Duke University Miles Simpson, North Carolina Central University Ron Wimberley, N.C. State University Robert Wortham, North Carolina Central University Editorial Assistants John W.M. Russell, Technical Consultant Austin W. Ashe, Duke University Submission
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Volume 8, Number 1 Spring/Summer 2010 Book Review of
Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle. Sunstein, Cass R. 2005. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 225. ISBN 52184823-7. September 11 represents for United States, as well as the world, the start of a new era. Even though many countries cope with terrorists in their own soil (such as Spain, United Kingdom even part of Latin America), the World Trade Center attacks signified a large psychological impact on security for citizens of the United States. With the passing of years, Americans saw how their day-to-day style of life substantially changed. Under such a context, Sunstein presents a striking but polemic work entitled Laws of Fear. Sunstein´s preliminary remarks deal with the question why people are frightened, or, as an alternative, why people feel safe when they should feel fear. Sunstein first examines the role played by rationality in the process of dread and its consequent relationship with democracy. From his point of view, in a democracy, or at least in a deliberative democracy, the debate predominates over other forms of deliberation to decrease somewhat involuntary errors. This is the point that distinguishes a deliberative democracy from a demagogic populism. In other words, the state of a disaster that involves a community might be prevented or partly mitigated whenever the issues that impinge on the public life are previously discussed, debated and forecasted. This belief would explain the reasons as to why democratic societies have more instruments to face disasters than totalitarian or authoritarian ones. Whereas the latter does not provide their citizens with the necessary steps to evaluate the pre-existing risks, the former invests a considerable amount of capital in the process of mitigation and preparedness for natural catastrophes. The problem of public fear is inextricably interrelated to the extent potential hazards are censored by the state. Sunstein goes on to acknowledge "democracies do best if they abstract from the largest questions and try to obtain a consensus from people who disagree on, or are unsure about, how to resolve those questions. In the context of fear, I suggest, it is possible to obtain just such a consensus… I understand fear to depend on some kind of judgment that we are in danger (Sunstein 2005:3)." Starting from the premise that fears are pre-determined by previous beliefs rooted in the ways of perceiving disrupting events, people seem to be prone to experience serious risks in matters that are relatively safe whereas in some circumstances avoid real threats because of ignorance or even imprudence. His main thesis is that the precautionary principle stems from a focal belief about health, safety and environment born in the core of European enlightenment during XVIIIth and XIXth centuries. Nonetheless, fear like other underlying emotions works as a cascade or better a virus that contaminates others hosts. In prospective, the social day-to-day interaction determines what can be considered a frightful event. Basically, Sunstein criticizes the thesis that points out that Europe accepts the precautionary principle while United States refuses it. Since Europeans overtly admit that the world should be contemplated within a margin of risk, there will be some gaps at times when capitalist states take the necessary steps to secure the life of their citizens. Conversely, American society seems to be unconcerned regarding the risks of global warming or genetic food modification policies. This suggests an erroneous idea that the United States requests a proof (evidence) of potential dangers to take action. A false opposition between United States and Europe leads scholars to a misleading direction in their reflection about impacts of fear. Sunstein emphasizes on the precautionary
principle should be reconsidered taking into account the following relevant
points.
A problem in this book that Sunstein is unable to resolve the problem of what contingent actually means. Also, the question immediately presents itself is how law can calculate sentences based just on speculation which is also based on the somewhat fuzzy principle of precaution. After all, judgments should be sustained by events that have already taken place. Even though the probabilities of harm are serious, how does one determine action about an offense which has never taken place? These two slippery questions reveal certain theoretical limitations around the concept of precautionary principle. This book is recommended for whose
readers concerned about the perception of risk, hazards and the necessary
policies to prevent the panic in general, not only to the mitigation of
reality-based risks, but also the assessment of under what circumstances
fear becomes panic.
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