The Torch Magazine,
The Journal and Magazine of the
International Association of Torch Clubs
For 87 Years
A Peer-Reviewed
Quality Controlled
Publication
ISSN Print 0040-9440
ISSN Online 2330-9261
Winter 2014
Volume 87, Issue 2
The
Rise and Fall of the Bethlehem
Steel Empire
by
Ted Haas
One day in 1942, my
father came home and cried. I had
never seen Dad cry. But he cried that
day because he was so grateful—he had
gotten a job in the accounting
department of the Bethlehem Steel
Corporation. He had lost his small
business in the Depression and had
struggled to support our family of five,
and now he was joining the nation's
seventh largest industrial
company—America's top military
contractor in World War II. This company
had built the Golden Gate Bridge, most
of the Manhattan skyscrapers, the George
Washington Bridge, the Chicago
Merchandise Mart and the United States
Supreme Court. Dad's future seemed
bright.
By the time I left
Bethlehem in 1975, however, the
corporation was awash in red ink. The
worst year in its 73-year history was
just ahead—1979, when on September 30,
"Black Friday," 2,500 shocked
white-collar workers were handed their
dismissal notices. Many successful
men and women in the company's
headquarters cried then. "A glorious era
was coming to a traumatic end," wrote
John Strohmeyer, editor of the Bethlehem
Globe Times for 28 years. That
awful year revealed a net loss of $488
million.
The crisis worsened.
Bethlehem Steel filed for bankruptcy
protection on October 17, 2001. The
United States Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation took over Steel's pensions
on December 18, and by May 7, 2003, the
International Steel Group purchased all
of Bethlehem Steel's assets. This
once-mighty industrial empire was no
more.
What happened? What
went wrong?
The Beginning
of a Steel Industry
In 1837, a Welshman named David Thomas
tried burning hard anthracite coal
instead of soft coke to produce iron.
His successful attempt would soon drive
a revolution 3,000 miles away in
Pennsylvania.
Northeastern
Pennsylvania was rich in anthracite
coal, iron ore and limestone.
Entrepreneurs Josiah White and Erskine
Hazard saw the potential in Thomas'
success and lured the Welshman to the
Lehigh Valley of Pennsylvania in 1839.
Thomas supervised the building of
Furnace No. 1, and by 1850 the Lehigh
Valley was the iron-making capital of
the nation. In the 1860s, the Lehigh
Valley Railroad Company built an
ironworks in South Bethlehem along the
Lehigh River to make iron rails for
tracks. Asa Packer, the
millionaire owner, Robert Sayre, a civil
engineer, and the gifted ironmaster John
Fritz spearheaded this venture, creating
the framework for Bethlehem Steel.
Bethlehem Iron, as it was then called,
contributed to the Union victory in the
Civil War. After the war, the company
committed themselves to making steel,
and a technological gem of a steel mill
was erected in South Bethlehem.
There 700 employees, mainly of German
and Irish descent, labored "in noise and
heat" to roll its first steel rails.
Packer and Sayre headed an elite
management team who treated their
employees as peasants in a medieval
feudal system. The workers resented this
paternalism, so from the beginning
relationships between management and
labor were a problem.
By 1873, the
Bethlehem plant had become an efficient
Bessemer steelworks. Large military
contracts led to open-hearth steel
making—an improvement over the Bessemer
technology—and Bethlehem Iron continued
to prosper. In 1899, the principal
shareholders of Bethlehem Iron organized
the new Bethlehem Steel Company; in
1901, the company was sold to Charles M.
Schwab, president of the U. S. Steel
Corporation, the nation's largest steel
maker. Schwab boasted, "I intend to make
Bethlehem the prize steel works of its
class in the entire world" (Hilliard and
Venditta 39).
The King of
Steel
Forging America,
Ardith Hilliard and David Venditta's
history of Bethlehem Steel, calls Schwab
"the king of steel." Early in 1901,
Schwab arranged a merger between
Carnegie's steel interests and those of
J. P. Morgan, creating the U. S. Steel
Corporation and becoming its first
president at age 39. However, he was not
given a free hand to make the progress
he wanted, so in May of the same year he
bought the fledgling Bethlehem Steel
Company for himself. He secured the
patent rights to Henry Grey's
revolutionary process for rolling
wide-flange beams and columns in a
single section directly from an ingot,
which enabled Bethlehem to erect
buildings "that seemed to kiss the
clouds." Labor problems confronted
Schwab, but he solved them in
management's favor. During World War I,
with fat military contracts from Britain
and France, Bethlehem became one of the
largest, most profitable companies in
the world, second only to U. S. Steel.
In the 1920s, Schwab
and his protégé Eugene Grace used the
money earned during the war to purchase
a number of competitors. Schwab turned
over daily management of Bethlehem Steel
to his "boy," Grace, but his strategies
continued to shape the company: the use
of pay incentives for managers and
workers to produce more, the application
of steel for new consumer products such
as autos, promotion from within, and a
central Board of Directors composed of
handsomely paid loyal top executives of
the company. He countered the labor
union movement threat by creating his
own cooperative version called the
"Bethlehem Employee Representation
Plan," giving labor representatives an
advisory capacity but retaining real
decision making as the prerogative of
management.
Schwab avoided the
appearance of anti-unionism but was no
friend to labor. One laborer at Sparrows
Point described work in the 1920s: "You
had to work till you dropped
dead…Retirement—hell, there was no such
thing." In the 1930s, President
Roosevelt's Secretary of Labor, Frances
Perkins, fought for the welfare of the
steel workers and tried to bring
management and labor together, but
Eugene Grace and other steel executives
strongly opposed these attempts. In
1936, John L. Lewis began to organize a
union in the steel industry and made
slow but real progress, with U.S. Steel
signing a union contract in1937, but
Grace and Bethlehem Steel continued to
resist unionization, declaring it was
"not necessary."
The New Captain
of the Ship
John Strohmeyer
assessed Eugene Grace in a 1986 book, Crisis
In Bethlehem. "When Schwab died in
1939, the company became a one-man show.
Grace's administrative style meant
keeping a finger on everything that went
on. […] his word was gospel in all
matters" (83-84). Grace "charted
the course of Bethlehem's growth and
prosperity with the solitary and supreme
status of a ship captain," and
shipbuilding was a crucial component of
Bethlehem's success. World War II was
another huge profit opportunity. When
Grace learned of Hitler's invasion of
Poland and Britain and France's
declaration of war upon Germany, he told
his golf partners at the Country Club
where he played regularly, "Gentlemen,
we are going to make some money!"
(Hilliard and Venditta 92). Bethlehem
soon got $300 million worth of orders
from Britain, and when Pearl Harbor
exploded, so did Bethlehem Steel.
Employment at the main plant more than
doubled, from 13,000 in 1939 to 31,500
in 1943. Bethlehem produced one-third of
the steel needed by the Navy in the war,
with gross sales of $1.33 billion. Grace
cooperated with the Administration and
found common ground with union leaders,
who pledged not to strike. By the end of
the war, Bethlehem was American's number
one military contractor. Grace boasted
he would provide the steel the world
needed to rebuild, and his company grew
fat in the post-war era. Grace was the
highest paid corporate executive in the
nation for many years. But trouble was
on the horizon.
A lone farseeing
leader, William H. Johnstone, chair of
the finance committee in Bethlehem
Steel's bonanza years, saw change
coming: new forces in the economy,
revolutionary new technology in steel
making, and traditional markets invaded
by international competition. He warned
his colleagues, but Bethlehem did not
heed—things were going too well. John F.
Heinz, a speechwriter for the top
executives, saw fresh ideas and
independent thought stifled. "The
definition of intelligence was to do
things the Bethlehem way…the way we
always did it in the past" (quoted in
Strohmeyer 85).
Grace also ignored
the growing power of the union, refusing
to bargain with labor despite President
Harry Truman's intervention. A
nationwide strike against the steel
industry ensued in 1946, and labor won.
Labor leaders proposed new approaches
for the industry, and one man, John G.
Roberts, Sr., General Manager of the
Sparrows Point plant, promoted
management-labor teamwork; however, his
wisdom did not prevail.
Management, led by Grace, resisted
progressive moves.
The 1950s began with
Grace, approaching eighty, still at the
helm. The Board of Directors and company
officers were still an "inside" group.
The autocratic Chairman perpetuated a
monolithic structure that produced
profits for decades. Fortune
magazine wrote, "Bethlehem has geared
every unit of its empire to a functional
efficiency that Adolf Hitler would
envy'" (qtd in Hilliard and Venditta
60).
In 1956 Bethlehem
Steel enlarged the Sparrows Point plant,
and as a result, 1957 was a very
profitable year, yielding the biggest
bonuses since 1929. But the world was on
the threshold of the space age. Demand
for steel was down, as manufacturers
utilized aluminum and plastic instead,
but Grace dismissed the idea of moving
to new high-tech products. It was not
until the 1960s, under CEO Arthur B.
Homer, that a modern Research Center was
established, yet even then the company
remained skeptical about change. In a
1962 interview with Fortune,
Homer said the company was rich enough
not to innovate. "We have a nice
business as it is."
Eugene Grace died in
July 1960 at age 83. Flags flew at
half-mast all over Bethlehem. A. B.
Homer succeeded him. A retirement policy
was instituted to make retirement
mandatory at age 65. But Homer did not
change the old pattern of raising steel
prices to pay for union wage
settlements, contributing to the famous
confrontation of President Kennedy with
the steel industry in 1962.
Slowly but surely the
laborers in the steel mills were gaining
economic justice, long overdue. When in
1965 a strike threat aroused President
Lyndon Johnson in the midst of the
expanding war in Vietnam, steelworkers
won a three-year contract with a wage
increase twice the size management
wanted to offer. This added cost was
multiplied by Bethlehem's commitment to
extend the benefits labor won to its
white-collar workers, by anachronistic
work rules that the union defended
religiously, by the thirteen-week
vacations granted to many employees, and
by rising health and pension benefits.
Unlike U.S. Steel, Bethlehem deferred
underwriting its pensions to the future
while using its cash to modernize and
expand plants.
Edmund F. Martin, who
became Chief Executive Officer in 1964,
made more changes. He wanted outside
Directors on the Board and lowered
executive salaries, and he oversaw the
opening of the new integrated Burns
harbor plant on the banks of Lake
Michigan. But times and technologies
were changing while Bethlehem was
clinging to the past, following Andrew
Carnegie's dictum that "Pioneering
doesn't pay." Faced with competition
from foreign steel makers, Bethlehem
lobbied the federal government to set
quotas on foreign steel rather than
develop the new technologies that would
enable it to offer quality products at
lower prices. In 1970, when Martin
handed the company over to Stewart S.
Cort, profits dipped below $100 million
for the first time in eight years.
Cort also faced a
serious discrimination suit filed by the
federal government against Bethlehem
because of the ways it dealt with
minorities. In 1973 it was the largest
industrial company ever to be ordered by
the Labor Department to correct its
discriminatory practices, primarily at
Sparrows Point. Bethlehem agreed to pay
millions in back pay to 40,000 minority
workers.
Lewis W. Foy became
the new chairman in 1974, a year in
which Bethlehem earned a record $342
million, with 115,720 employees at work.
But in 1975 Japanese steel makers
surpassed Americans in productivity.
From now on American mills were losing
market share to foreign imports in a
dwindling market. The year 1977 ended
with a net loss of $488 million. Yet, as
late as 1979, Foy was claiming that "the
market for steel is growing" and was
pushing for expansion when what was
needed was retrenchment and
modernization. He retired in 1980, and
by 1985 admitted to Strohmeyer that "a
helluva lot of mistakes" were made. "We
didn't keep ourselves lean enough […].
We tried to be all things to all people"
(Strohmeyer 103-04). He laid blame on
the government for its antitrust actions
against Bethlehem, its tough stance on
steel pricing, and its expensive
environmental mandates. Yet when
Strohmeyer asked him directly, "What
took you so long to recognize that
American steel was in trouble?" Foy
replied, "I don't know how to answer
that" (107).
To cope with their
declining fortunes, the company hired an
outsider—Donald H. Trautlein, a
successful accountant who knew little
about steel making but much about
Bethlehem Steel's fiscal condition,
having for many years handled its
account for Price Waterhouse. In his
first report to employees, he told them
just how sick the company was and called
for drastic measures, including pay cuts
for executives and reduction of excess
salaried workers. There were mass
dismissals, changing many lives
overnight. Sparrows Point became a
graveyard. Employment at the Bethlehem
plant plummeted to 5,661 in 1985. When
the research laboratory was sold, the
future looked grim indeed. Trautlein got
out while the getting was good; in 1986
he was given a generous salary increase
and a "golden parachute."
From that time until
2003, under four successive new CEOs,
Bethlehem struggled, managing some
profitable quarters when conditions
allowed, but clearly fighting a losing
battle to survive. In the 1990s
pensioners outnumbered workers three to
one, and mini-mills such as Nucor were
winning contracts Bethlehem normally
won. 1992 ended with $550 million in
losses. On November 18, 1995, the
company ended steel making in Bethlehem.
Tom Jones, a former union president for
the local in Bethlehem, mourned, "The
steel that built half of New York City
was rolled in those mills, and they just
let it all die" (Hilliard and Venditta
136).
In 2001 the company
posted a record $1.1 billion loss, and
with a combined debt of $4.5 billion
filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
protection. In 2002 its once blue-chip
stock was removed from the New York
Stock Exchange for trading below $1.00
per share. In December the U.S. Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation took over
Bethlehem's pensions, and in 2003
International Steel Group bought its
assets for $1.5 billion. Fortune
magazine published an "autopsy" by Carol
J. Loomis in its April 2004 issue,
concluding with the question, "Could a
really great businessman like Jack Welch
[who led General Electric successfully
for many years] have come into the
company 40 years ago and saved it?" The
experts who were asked thought the
question unanswerable, so the magazine
posed the question directly to Welch. He
puzzled over it for a while, and then
finally said, "I don't think Christ
could have done it" (Loomis).
What Caused the
Death of Bethlehem Steel?
For this paper, I
interviewed several Bethlehem Steel
employees who knew the situation from
the inside. Michael Zito started as a
laborer in 1940 and worked his way up to
become General Manager of the Blast
Furnace Division. He supervised 500
people, and was responsible for blast
furnaces that could produce
multi-million tons of iron in an
eight-hour shift. What went wrong? He
cited not only "the greed of the labor
unions" and "much office labor waste,
many people hired with little to do,"
but also management mistakes, "the
profits that should have been channeled
into making a better steel product, more
efficiently and less costly," and the
"complacency of top management, who did
not see the competition from foreign
steel, or chose to ignore it." Looking
back in retirement and worried about the
future of his pension, Mike wrote, "that
such a large prestigious company that
was such a leader in its industry, that
meant so much to the economy, could
collapse in front of our faces so
quickly seems inconceivable."
I also listened to
Kenneth Niewoehner, a metallurgical
engineer in the home office. Ken was a
"legacy employee," his father having
long managed the St. Louis sales office.
(By age 10, Ken had seen the movie
"Building the Golden Gate Bridge by
Bethlehem" many times.) Ken sees the
company's demise as a complex story.
Management kept unprofitable steel
plants open too long, he believes; in
1965 U.S. Steel shut down all products
requiring more than four man-hours per
ton, but Bethlehem tried to save the
products, the plants and the men's jobs,
taking terrible losses. New mini-mills
that had no past work rules or high
labor costs grew profitable at
Bethlehem's expense. The union would not
make concessions needed in wages and
benefits. "In hindsight," Ken concludes,
"the demise might have been prevented by
management taking a ruthless position,
shutting down facilities immediately
when they showed a loss."
Three
Big Questions and Their Answers
1. What made
the Bethlehem Steel Corporation such a
large, successful industry for so long?
Charles Schwab utilized new steel
technology, found an efficient and
ruthless (in regard to labor) operations
man, Eugene Grace, and gave generous
financial rewards to the men at the top.
The economics of two world wars with
post war expansion were important
factors. The laborers in the steel mills
and the white collar workers who
directed or supported them worked
diligently as a team for many years,
proud to be number one or two in America
and grateful for the compensation that
enabled them to live well.
2. Why did this
empire decline and fall? Top
management failed to meet the challenge
of changing technology, changing
markets, and world competition. Greed,
foremost that of management but also
that of the labor union, won out over
rationality. Add in failure to do long
range thinking; obesity instead of
leanness; smart competition from abroad,
sometimes supported by governments;
smart new competition at home; and
finally, the vagaries of economic times
and a corporate culture not open to
change.
3. Why does this sad
story matter? Because this could happen
again. Our leaders will always face new
challenges that demand new
responses. They ignore such
challenges at their peril. As George
Santayana, the famous Spanish-American
philosopher observed, "Those who cannot
remember the past are condemned to
repeat it."
Bibliography
Hilliard, Ardith
and Venditta, David. Forging America:
The Story of Bethlehem Steel.
Allentown, PA: The Morning Call Press,
2003.
Loomis, Carol J. "The Sinking of
Bethlehem Steel." Fortune 149:7
(April 5, 2004). Also available at
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/
fortune/fortune_archive/2004/04/05/366339/
Reutter, Mark. Making Steel: Sparrows
Point and the Rise and Ruin of
American Industrial Might. Urbana
and Chicago: University of Illinois
Press, 2004.
Strohmeyer, John. Crisis in
Bethlehem. Bethesda, MD: Adler
& Adler, Publishers, 1986.
Young, Donald and Bartholomew, Ann.
Bethlehem Steel: A Photographic
History. Easton, PA: National
Canal Museum and National Museum of
Industrial History, 2010.
Author's
Biography
"Ted" is Minister Emeritus of Grace
United Church of Christ, Frederick,
Maryland, where he served as pastor for
19 years. He grew up in Eastern
Pennsylvania and graduated Summa Cum
Laude from Muhlenberg College, earned
his Bachelor of Divinity degree from
Lancaster Theological Seminary and a
Master of Theology degree from Princeton
Theological Seminary. He also
served pastorates in Hagerstown, MD and
in the Bethlehem, PA area, as well as
several Interim Pastorates since
retiring from full-time
ministry.
Community service
characterized his more than 40-year
ministry. He won awards for
service from the Pennsylvania School
Boards Association, Maryland Public
Libraries for service on both the local
and state level, and for many years’
service as a volunteer Fire Company
Chaplain in Frederick.
He was a founding
member of the Frederick, Maryland Torch
Club and the Torch Club of Westminster,
Maryland. He served twice as
President of the Frederick Club and five
years on the IATC Board as Region 3
Director. A sabbatical in Japan
led to his first published Torch
paper, "The Yeast That Is Changing
Japan."
Ted worked in the Combustion Department
of Bethlehem Steel for three summers
(1947-49) and in his twenty years as a
pastor and community leader knew many
Steel employees. His paper is based not
only on published sources but also on
personal and written interviews with
former Steel employees, from both labor
and management.
Ted and his wife, Norine, currently IATC
President-elect, celebrated their 57th
anniversary in 2013.
His paper on the Bethlehem Steel Company
crisis was presented to the Frederick
Torch Club in January 2005 and to the
Westminster Club in April of 2011.
©2014 by the International
Association of Torch Clubs
Return to Home Page
|
|