The Torch Magazine,
The Journal and Magazine of the
International Association of Torch Clubs
For 91 Years
A Peer-Reviewed
Quality Controlled
Publication
ISSN Print 0040-9440
ISSN Online 2330-9261
Spring
2017
Volume 90, Issue 3
Free Will
by Leland W.
Robinson
We humans can mull things over, come
to a decision, and then act on that
decision. We can also set
long-term goals and dedicate our
actions, over an extended period of
time, toward achieving those goals
while simultaneously overcoming
obstacles in our path.
Furthermore, we can sometimes
successfully resist intense social
pressure to engage in behavior we
consider unethical or immoral.
If we consider these abilities as our
"will," then we definitely have a
will. But what does it mean to have a
"free" will? Of what might our
will be free?
In this paper I
will examine two ways of answering
that question, and thus two
definitions of free will. The
first defines free will as freedom of
the human will from causation itself,
while the second defines it as freedom
of the will from constraints such as
physical and social coercions, from
our own ignorance or lack of mental
health, and so forth. I will
argue that our will lacks the first
type of freedom, but enjoys at least
some measure of the second.
Finally, I will examine the social and
spiritual implications of the fact
that our will lacks freedom from
causation.
Contra-Causal
Free Will
The claim that humans
have a free inner agent, an unmoved
mover that allows us to make decisions
and initiate actions ex nihilo,
has roots, at least here in the West,
in ancient Greek philosophy,
Hellenistic Judaism, and especially in
early Christian theology as the
Christians struggled to reconcile bad
human behavior with the idea of an
all-powerful, benevolent creator god
(Mecklenburger 82-87). The
apparent contradiction was reconciled
by claiming that God gave to the human
soul the power to freely choose
between good and evil. Today
people may attribute this power to
make uncaused decisions to the ego or
to some other psychological construct,
but the idea is fundamentally the
same. In this paper I will
refer to this claimed human capacity
of the will as "contra-causal free
will." (1)
Scientists, generally, have rejected
the possibility of this type of free
will since it violates their
understanding that the universe is a
determined one in which every event is
caused. So, from the perspective
of science, even though we humans make
decisions that lead to actions that
have consequences, those decisions
have no freedom from the web of
causation. Rather, the decisions
are caused by our genetic inheritance
and environmental inputs. (2)
Despite more than a century of trying,
no one has yet developed even a single
scientifically sound hypothesis that
explains how the human decision-making
process could be free of the web of
causation (Sompolinsky 40).
Given the apparent impossibility of
developing a scientific explanation of
contra-causal free will, I personally
take the position that it does not
exist.
Besides, when you think about it,
contra-causal free will is also
illogical. Choosing requires a
motive or reason to make one choice
rather than another. If we could
make decisions that were free of
causes such as genetic predispositions
or learned values, motives, desires,
fears or habits, then on what basis
would those decisions be made?
As Tom Clark has put it: "All we
need to be good choosers is what we've
got: a sensory and motivational system
that responds adaptively to immediate
exigencies, plus a sophisticated
reality simulation system that
generates hypotheses which can die in
our stead" (4). We don't need
some imagined ability to make uncaused
decisions.
Free Will as
Freedom From Constraints
The second definition
sees free will as the ability to act
in accordance with our will when not
prevented from doing so by coercions,
constraints or compulsions ("Free
will" 16). According to this way
of using the term, if our thoughts and
decisions are free from physical and
social coercions and constraints, and
also free from our own ignorance and
lack of full mental health, we can say
we possess free will.
Individuals differ
tremendously in the number of
limitations placed on the exercise of
their will. Someone living in
prison or in a police state, or who
has learned to be extremely prejudiced
and closed minded, or who is suffering
from extreme ignorance or serious
mental illness, has less of this type
of free will than does another who is
more fortunate. None of us
possesses a will completely free of
such limitations, so this type of
freedom of the will is, by its very
nature, limited. (3)
Because we only experience the world
subjectively and are almost totally
ignorant of the causal factors guiding
our thoughts and behaviors, it is easy
to confuse this second type of free
will with the first, with
contra-causal free will.
Subjectively, it feels like our
decisions are unrestrained by causal
influences. At the time we are
mulling things over and trying to
decide, we are unaware of the causes
of our thoughts or how those causes
will result in the particular decision
we will reach. Even after we
have decided on one option rather than
another, our subjective feeling is
that we might have made the other
choice and certainly were completely
free to have done so. And, of
course, our language reinforces this
subjective experience. For
example, I am likely to say "I decided
to eat out tonight," rather than "The
decision to eat out tonight arose
within me," even though the latter
statement is perhaps more accurate
(Breer 34-39).
Nevertheless,
because the decision to eat out
tonight arose specifically within me,
and I was the one who followed through
on my decision by going out to eat, I
can say that I possess the ability to
make a decision and to realize it
though my actions. In this sense
only, I have a will. And since
no internal or external impediment
kept me from making that decision and
realizing it through my actions, I
can, in this sense only, claim that my
will is free. There is no
inaccuracy unless I forget that all of
my thoughts, decisions and actions are
caused. There is no inaccuracy
unless, in my conceit, I imagine
myself to be an unmoved mover who can
think thoughts and make decisions ex
nihilo.
Humans
are Complexly Related to their
Environment
Once the
autobiographical self evolved among
our evolutionary ancestors (Damasio),
hominids became much more complexly
related to their environment. As
a result, we humans are very far
indeed from being simple
stimulus-response machines.
Each of us is a
unique individual whose genetic and
environmental inputs are unimaginably
complex. Each of us has our own
unique genetic inputs, (4) and our
environmental inputs, from conception
onward, differ greatly even for twins
raised in the same family. We
all have differing experiences, and as
a result we all have many billions of
memories in our brains, with no two
people having the same combination of
memories. (5) Whenever we come
to a decision, that decision is a
result of an interaction between
current stimuli, our own genetic
inputs, and our own unique combination
of memories. These memories, of
course, include values and goals we
have learned. Furthermore, we
have behavioral predispositions that
are determined partly by our genetic
input and partly by the memory traces
left by our prior experiences.
And, of course, we also are caused to
selectively remember and selectively
interpret those memories. (6)
In making
decisions, the human brain utilizes
what is called its executive function,
which involves bringing on line
aspects of the brain that allow us to
imagine different possible decisions,
and to imagine courses of action based
on those decisions. It also
involves accessing the brain's memory
bank for the possible relevance of
past experiences. The executive
function is a complex and impressive
process—so impressive that it is easy
to confuse it with contra-causal free
will. But the executive function
doesn't operate in a vacuum,
unaffected by prior causal
influences. It too is enmeshed
in the web of causation.
All a Matter of
Luck
Since all human
thoughts and actions are caused, the
pertinent question is whether a
particular cause will have positive or
negative consequences. If, for
example, we are taught that it is good
to plan ahead, to sometimes delay
gratification, to behave in a moral
way and meet our responsibilities,
these learned ideas can have positive
influences.
If, on the other hand, we are taught,
either directly or through cultural
influences, that it is acceptable to
manipulate or exploit those with less
power, that people in groups other
than our own are to be treated with
suspicion and hostility, that one has
few if any responsibilities, or that
planning ahead is not necessary for a
successful life, then these learned
ideas can have negative influences.
Someone
having a generally positive influence
on the world is someone who has been
lucky enough to have good genes and to
have been educated well, using the
word "education" in its broadest
meaning. Someone having a
generally negative influence is
someone who has not been so
lucky. It is all a matter of
luck, and it is appropriate for those
of us who have been luckier to be
compassionate toward those who have
been less fortunate.
Why Does It
Matter?
Since each of us is a unique human
being with the ability to consciously
make decisions and to carry out our
decisions through our behavior, why
does it matter that our decisions are
not free of the universe's vast web of
causation? Why does it matter
that we lack contra-causal free will?
Some have argued
that it matters a great deal—that if
the public realized that no one has
contra-causal free will, then the
moral order will be undermined.
However, if a particular moral norm
has a positive influence on the social
order, then it will have that effect
even if we give up the idea of
contra-causal free will. In
fact, if people made uncaused
decisions, why would we bother
teaching them moral codes? We
teach them moral codes because we hope
that these codes will have a positive
impact on their behavior, and will
counteract some of the negative
influences of our culture.
It is true that the lack of
contra-causal free will undermines the
philosophical/moral notion of fault,
and so some are concerned about the
potential impact on our legal
system. However, society still
has the right to protect itself
against anti-social behavior, and
legal notions of fault may still be
applied. There are five reasons
why a society might punish those whose
behavior they define as
criminal: deterrence,
incapacitation, rehabilitation, victim
restitution, and retribution
("Philosophy of Punishment").
With recognition that we have no
contra-causal free will, four of the
five justifications for punishment—all
except retribution—still stand, and
retribution is not necessary for the
effective functioning of a criminal
justice system. In fact, a
strong argument can be made that our
criminal justice system could be more
rationally designed, and would be more
effective in reducing criminal
behavior, if all thought of
retribution (vengeance) was eliminated
(Whitman).
Some have argued
that if people realize all of their
thoughts, decisions, and actions are
caused, then they will feel like
robots with no real control over their
lives. They might think, for
example, that since everything is
caused, everything is predestined, and
therefore the decisions they make do
not matter. They can get as
drunk as they want at a bar because
whether they get in an accident while
driving home is predestined, and there
is nothing they can do about it.
This, of course, is faulty
reasoning. Just because our
thoughts and decisions are caused does
not mean they do not have very real
consequences, and to learn otherwise
is to learn a completely erroneous,
damaging and dangerous idea.
Individuals who have deeply integrated
an understanding that contra-causal
free will does not exist generally
report favorable consequences from
having reached this
understanding. For example, Sam
Harris writes:
Speaking
from personal experience, I think
that losing the sense of free will
has only improved my ethics – by
increasing my feelings of compassion
and forgiveness, and diminishing my
sense of entitlement to the fruits
of my own good luck. […] Losing a
belief in free will has not made me
fatalistic—in fact, it has increased
my feelings of freedom. My
hopes, fears, and neuroses seem less
personal and indelible (45-46).
Referring to his realization of the
non-existence of contra-causal free
will, Albert Einstein wrote that it
became "a continual consolation in the
face of life’s hardships, my own and
others', and an unfailing well-spring
of tolerance" (8-9). Derk
Pereboom writes that the realization
"holds out the promise of greater
equanimity by reducing the anger that
hinders fulfillment" and by "releasing
us from the harmful passions that
contribute so much to human distress"
(Pereboom, Living Without Free
Will, 212-213). For Paul Breer,
giving up a belief in contra-causal
free will allows us to "experience
more 'ease of heart,' more quiet joy,
more stability and clarity of mind,
greater acceptance of ourselves,
greater acceptance of others, more
patience, more honesty and openness,
greater capacity for intimacy, and
greater equanimity in the face of
loss" (285).
Gaining Greater
Compassion
All societies could
benefit from more compassion and less
selfishness and cruelty, but perhaps
our outmoded and inaccurate view that
we humans possess contra-causal free
will gets in the way of our ability to
be compassionate. If we see
people whose behavior is anti-social
and harmful as individuals who could
have behaved better but freely chose
to behave in harmful ways, it is
difficult to feel compassion for
them. Instead, we are likely to
feel moral indignation, anger, and
hostility. It is far easier to
behave toward such individuals in a
wise and compassionate manner if we
recognize that they are not people
with an evil free will who deserve to
suffer, but rather are people who,
just like the rest of us, are a part
of the causal web of the
universe. We then see both the
thought processes that resulted in
their anti-social behavior and the
anti-social behavior itself as tragic
outcomes of unfortunate causal
flows. It is then far easier for
us to react with wisdom and
compassion, and such reactions are
always more effective than reactions
based on hostility bred from
ignorance.
Moving beyond a
belief in contra-causal free will not
only, as Paul Breer points out, makes
it "easier for us to be humane by
defusing the moral wrath that
intensifies our need to hurt each
other" (295), but can also greatly
help us be compassionate toward
ourselves. We can move beyond
the guilt and self-blame which, at
their extreme, can make life too
painful to endure. While we may
still feel saddened, even filled with
regret, when our behavior violates
norms in which we believe, recognizing
that our behavior was caused can save
us from being "guilt-ridden" and help
us deal more objectively and
constructively with our
shortcomings. And while we may
still feel pleased and fortunate
regarding our accomplishments, we may
avoid the extreme feelings of
self-pride and conceit. Just as
we can deal with others in a more
dispassionate and objective manner, so
in like manner can we deal with
ourselves. Over time, as we more
fully integrate into our daily
consciousness this new understanding,
we can gain a greater "ease of heart,"
and our emotional world can become
richer and more satisfying as we learn
to be compassionate with ourselves and
with others (Breer 210-211).
Feeling One with
the Universe
In addition to
helping us develop compassion, a deep
understanding that we have no
contra-causal free will can also help
us feel one with the universe, a
feeling that is, perhaps, the essence
of spirituality (Capra 8-9).
Once we realize that our will, our
consciousness, our thoughts, our
feelings, are all fully caused, it is
a small step to the realization that
everything about us is also fully
caused. And when we examine any
one causal flow, we discover that we
can trace it back in time and out in
space until we realize that everything
is connected. We need only to
fully incorporate that reality into
our consciousness. When we do,
our sense of existential loneliness
and estrangement drops away, and we
feel the warm embrace of a universe
from which, in actual fact, we have
never been separated.
This does not
involve believing in something for
which there is no scientific
evidence. Instead it involves
deeply recognizing what science
already tells us is true.
Science tells us that our bodies, like
everything else in the universe, are
quite literally made of stardust and
that this directly connects us to the
universe (Schrijver & Schrijver;
Stager). And these atoms, these
elements that make up one's body,
created in distant stars, are
constantly being inter-changed with
our environment. Each of
us, in every aspect of our being, is
fully enmeshed in the vast and
unimaginably complex causal web of
matter and energy that science reveals
to us. Guy Claxton puts it this
way: "Whether we feel it or know
it or not, it is a matter of
scientific fact that we are "children
of the universe." No matter how
much we may long to belong, in truth
we already do" (96).
Conclusion
Although the
concept of contra-causal free will has
been promoted by religion, it is not
my purpose to criticize religious
faith. Pope Francis, among many
others, exemplifies how a traditional
religious faith can lead to a
beautiful compassion for, and sense of
unity with, our fellow human beings
and with all of nature. Without
ignoring the negative impacts of
organized religion, we can still
recognize that those who have
religious faith may be considered, in
some ways, fortunate.
For those of us, however, who for
whatever constellation of causes find
ourselves unable to fully and
whole-heartedly experience that faith,
I would suggest there is another way
to tame the insecure and needy ego: we
can abandon the idea that we possess
the miraculous and supernatural power
to make decisions free of the causal
forces controlling everything else in
the universe. In doing so, we
may discover that a door has been
opened to a rich and satisfying state
of consciousness, one requiring no
belief in the supernatural.
A
partial and misguided understanding of
our lack of contra-causal free will
may indeed lead to passivity and
irresponsibility, but a deeper
exploration can enlarge our compassion
for ourselves and for others and our
sense of oneness with the
universe. This, in turn, can
lead to less selfishness, increased
kindness toward other living
creatures, increased willingness to
protect our environment, and a deeper
sense of peace and
happiness. It is a path
that has brought some significant
relief to this angry and judgmental
idealist, and I recommend it.
Notes
(1) Other terms are also in
widespread use, including
"metaphysical free will" and
"agent-causal libertarianism."
(2)
Although events at the subatomic level
seem not to follow our normal
understanding of causation, almost all
neuroscientists today agree that
quantum effects play no role in human
thoughts and decisions. This is
so for three reasons: 1)
Thoughts and decisions involve highly
complex interactions between a great
many nerve cells located in several
areas of the brain, so any quantum
effects would be averaged out far
below this level (Pereboom,
"Determinism al Dente" 12, 21,
34). 2) The human brain operates
at warm temperatures, while quantum
computing "requires cold temperatures
to avoid a quick loss of quantum
coherence" (Dehaene 263). 3) The
time scale for even awareness of the
external world, let alone
decision-making, is "unrelated to the
femtosecond (10 raised to -15) scale
at which this quantum decoherence
typically occurs" (Dehaene
263-264). See also Siefe.
As a result, "there is overwhelming
scientific evidence that microscopic
processes in the brain are just those
predicted by familiar laws of physics
and chemistry" (Sompolinsky 34-35).
(3) It
also should be noted that a great deal
of our daily behavior is free of
conscious decision-making (Bargh and
Chartrand).
(4) Even
identical twins are not genetically
identical (Brogaard).
(5) The
memory capacity of the human brain has
been estimated at about 2,500
terabytes (Reber). To put that
in perspective, the 19 million volumes
in the U.S. Library of Congress
represents only about 10 terabytes of
data.
(6) What
we have here are open systems with
immensely complex additive and
multiplicative interaction effects.
Works Cited
Bargh, John A. and
Tanya L Chartrand. "The Unbearable
Automaticity of Being." American
Psychologist 54.7 (July 1999):
462-479.
Breer, Paul. The Spontaneous
Self: Viable Alternatives to Free
Will. Cambridge, MA:
Institute for Naturalistic Philosophy,
1989.
Brogaard, Berit. "Identical Twins
Are Not Genetically Identical."
Psychology Today, 25 November
2012. (Web, accessed 29 July 2015).
Capra, Fritjof. The Tao of
Physics: An Exploration of the
Parallels between Modern Physics and
Eastern Mysticism.
1975. Boston: Shambhala, 2010.
Clark, Tom. "Freedom From Free
Will." NPR. 24 February 2010
(Web, accessed 4 June 2015).
Claxton, Guy. "Neurotheology:
Buddhism, Cognitive Science and Mystical
Experience." The Psychology of
Awakening: Buddhism, Science, and Our
Day-to-Day Lives. Eds. Guy
Watson, Stephen Batchelor, and Guy
Claxton. York Beach, ME: Samuel Weiser,
2000. 90-111.
Dehaene, Stanislas.
Consciousness and the Brain:
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Thoughts. New York: Penguin
Books, 2014.
Damasio, Antonio. Self Comes
To Mind: Constructing the Conscious
Brain. New York: Random
House, 2010.
Einstein, Albert. Ideas and
Opinions. New York: Crown,
1982.
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Harris, Sam. Free Will.
New York: Free Press, 2012.
Mecklenburger, Ralph D. Our
Religious Brains. Woodstock,
VT: Jewish Lights, 2012.
Pereboom, Derk. "Determinism al
Dente." Nous 29.1 (March
1995): 21-45.
---. Living Without Free Will.
Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University
Press, 2001.
"Philosophy of Punishment."
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November 2014).
Reber, Paul. "What Is the Memory
Capacity of the Human Brain?" Scientific
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accessed 21 June 2015).
Schrijver, Karl and Iris
Schrijver. Living With the
Stars: How the Human Body is Connected
to the Life Cycles of the Earth, the
Planets, and the Stars.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
Seife, Charles. "Cold Numbers
Unmake the Quantum Mind." Science.
287.5454 (4 February 2000).
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Perspective on Human Choice." Judaism,
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Eds. Yatzhak Berger and David
Shatz. Lanham, MD: Rowman &
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2014).
Author's
Biography
Originally from California, Leland W.
Robinson has long had an interest in
the natural and social sciences as
well as philosophy and religion.
Leland served in
both the Army Reserves and the Peace
Corps (India, 1966-68), with the
latter experience strengthening his
interest in Hinduism and
Buddhism. After his Peace Corps
years, Leland earned an MA and Ph.D.
in sociology from Northwestern
University, and then began a 30-year
career as a sociology professor at the
University of Tennessee,
Chattanooga.
Leland greatly valued and enjoyed his
role as a teacher, but also is pleased
that during his ten years as
Department Head he was able to help
his department experience record
growth in number of faculty, student
enrollment, course offerings,
scholarship, and outreach to the
community.
Now retired,
Leland moved to Frederick, Maryland,
in 2006.
"Free Will" was
presented to the Frederick Torch Club
on October 26, 2015.
©2017 by the International
Association of Torch Clubs
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