The Torch Magazine,
The Journal and Magazine of the
International Association of Torch Clubs
For 92 Years
A Peer-Reviewed
Quality Controlled
Publication
ISSN Print 0040-9440
ISSN Online 2330-9261
Spring
2018
Volume 91, Issue 3
Consciousness
by William J.
House
Consciousness is one of the most
perplexing concepts people have
struggled to understand and
explain. In this paper, the
etymological history of the word consciousness
will be examined, along with some
prominent experimental facts, a bit of
the pertinent neurophysiology, and
some important theoretical positions.
Consciousness
is a word of fairly recent origin that
probably stands for several
interrelated phenomena. First, consciousness
is necessarily personal and
private. Second, as people write
or speak, they are interested in
gaining the reader's attention
so that he or she may follow the
author's thoughts and
understanding. From one
perspective, the writer is attempting
to engage and manipulate the reader's
consciousness. From another, the
communication is merely linking words
that the author hopes others have in
common.
For example,
teachers try to find words and
personal experiences that they believe
they have in common with their
students. But the question
always remains: does the student's
mimicking of the instructor's words on
essays or identifying the identical
phrase from the textbook on a multiple
choice exam mean that the teacher and
students have connected their
consciousness? The same question
should be asked of the amazing ability
of "Watson," the artificial
intelligence computer program that won
against really smart humans on the
television show Jeopardy.
It applies as well to the stunning
observations of gorillas, chimpanzees,
and other animals who seem to
demonstrate understanding of human
language. Do computers, animals,
and, yes, fellow humans share
conscious experience? Or
do we merely infer from the actions of
others, correctly or not, that they
have consciousness just as we
do?
But then,
what is an individual's
consciousness? There are many
similarities between one person's
actions and the actions of
others. People's behavior
corresponds with what they have come
to think of as their
"consciousness." They watch
television, sit and think, read books
and articles, and converse with
friends about what they see and
ponder. But is it justified for them
to infer from the performance of these
actions by others that such an
actually invisible state as
consciousness exists?
Marvin
Minsky, one of the founders of modern
"artificial intelligence," concluded
in an interview:
The
word "consciousness" is a clever
trick that we use to keep from
thinking about how thinking works.
We take a lot of different phenomena
and we give them all the same name,
and then you think you've got it.
On the other
hand, cognitive scientist, Donald
Hoffman (2014) has argued the radical
empiricist view that consciousness and
experience are all that
exists.
Ultimately,
consciousness may be merely a "trick"
word that describes many different
parts of our very complicated
mentality and our endlessly
fascinating repertoire of
behavior. Or, the word may stand
for the complete reality of
what's happening in our minds and the
limits of our grasp of the "universe"
in which we believe that we exist.
Etymology
Our modern
word consciousness comes from
a legal term used by Roman
lawyers. The Latin polymath
Cicero (106-43 BCE) used the Latin
word conscientia to mean
having shared knowledge, for good or
ill, maybe secretly with another
person. Later, St. Thomas
Aquinas (1225-1274 CE) extended that
law-term to mean our shared knowledge
with God—certainly not merely an
ordinary someone else. This led
to the creation of our word conscience,
the internal understanding of what is
good versus evil that is gained from
our personal mental connection with
the Creator or another inherent moral
source.
The evolution
of the word "consciousness" and,
possibly, the concept itself continued
with the work of René Descartes
(1596-1650). The great thinker
wrote about our minds' independence
from our bodies. Our minds,
according to Descartes, are not
physical but are nonetheless able to
direct our physical actions. The
essence of this "mind-body"
interaction is (in Latin) conscius,
the awareness of our own
thought. The philosopher
famously used this idea to show how we
know of our own existence:"Cogito
ergo sum" or (a paraphrase) "my
consciousness proves my
existence". Indeed, maybe,
consciousness is the only proof we
have of who we are.
Ignoring this
Cartesian puzzle, John Locke
(1632-1704) proceeded to coin the new
English words "conscious" and "consciousness"
in their modern sense. Locke
first used the new word to describe shared
knowledge, just as the Roman lawyers
did. But later in his work,
Locke employed the new, more
reflective word, to mean personal
knowledge of one's own self. He
wrote in his Essay Concerning
Human Understanding (1689), "I
shall enquire into the origin of […]
ideas […] that a man observes and is
conscious of having in his [own]
mind."
In 1714,
German thinker Gottfried Leibnitz
(1646-1716) published a work called La
Monadologie in which he created
a new French word, apperception,
by which he meant personal consciousness.
This philosopher viewed consciousness
as the awareness of unity or
distinctiveness, and, most
importantly, the realization of one's
self. Unlike Descartes, Leibnitz
endorsed the act of perceiving
the world rather than the more passive
thought about our
mutual condition as the central issue
of consciousness.
Further,
Leibnitz proposed a continuum or scale
of our awareness that corresponds with
our actions and experience, the "petite
perceptions" or levels of
consciousness. Indeed, Leibnitz
wrote that "all things are full of
life and consciousness," and his idea
set the stage for the coexistence of unconsciousness
along with the gradations of
awareness. Moreover, according
to Leibnitz, consciousness is a universal
product of creation--perhaps, even,
the ultimate goal. (A comparable
idea was later developed by Carl Jung
[1875-1961]: the "collective
unconsciousness.")
Immanuel Kant
(1724-1804) brought the developing
concept of consciousness into modern
times with his examination of how we
humans think and then freely choose
what to do in his Critique of Pure
Reason. First, this philosopher
proposed that our senses provide raw
information through "a priori categories"—innate
ways that we sort out our sensory
experiences. Then, these mental
compartments are amalgamated into the
"unity of consciousness." All of
the sensory information that regularly
bombards our separate senses are
brought together into a single
view of who, where, and when we are.
In Principles
of Psychology (1890), American
psychologist William James (1842-1910)
moved toward explaining how our moment
to moment awareness works using the
famous idea of the "stream of
consciousness." Consciousness,
for James, is the dynamic process of
sensing and remembering the immediate
past, thereby creating what he called
the "specious present"—a fleeting and
dubious moment. What James
called "Self-Consciousness" is the
core of one's actively changing
knowledge of how one personally
relates to the world. To James,
our continually developing idea of who
we are and of how we relate to the
barrage of worldly experience and our
always burgeoning memories is the very
basis of our consciousness. But
how does our individual experience
combine to produce the dramatically
unique persons that we become?
Sigmund Freud
(1856-1939) attempted to apply the
First Law of Thermodynamics
(conservation of energy) from physics
and chemistry to the understanding of
consciousness. This law requires
that the action of any system
be accounted for with a constant level
of energy. That is, although
energy may appear to change as action
occurs, all of the power of the system
must be preserved without addition or
subtraction of outside force.
Freud was one of the first to apply
this influential physical law to
psychology.
Freud
conceived of the energy of the human
mind as powerful drives that are the
product of our interaction with the
world. Following Charles
Darwin's (1809 –1882) theory of
natural and sexual selection, Freud
argued that our biological energy is
directed toward self-preservation and
consequent species preservation
through procreation—sex. And
that is where Freud's theory enters
into the discussion of
consciousness.
Greatly
influenced by Leibniz' theory of "petit
perceptions" or degrees of
consciousness, Freud proposed that
human action is caused by drives that
we only marginally realize or to which
we are totally oblivious. That
is, some of the motivational energy of
our actions comes from powerful unconscious
drives. And, indeed, the
consciousness of our self (in Freud's
terms, the Ego) is fabricated to serve
these basic self- and thus
species-serving sensual drives (for
Freud, the Id). The definitive account
of this idea is in Freud's Five
Lectures on Psychoanalysis (1910).
Some
Empirical Facts
The concept
of "consciousness" developed along
with the words used to describe the
ineffable sense of "knowing" that we
all seem to share. Unlike the
similar enigma, gravity, consciousness
as it may exist outside of our
completely personal experience can
only be totally and exasperatingly inferred.
However, perhaps a careful examination
of the words that we use and the
undeniable facts of behavior and
neuroscience will lead to
understanding our own consciousness
and what seems to be our mutual
experience.
The
Cocktail Party Phenomenon. You
have surely experienced being in a
noisy restaurant or party in which you
are trying to heed the words of a
friend. Then, from across the
room, your own name is spoken and
immediately your attention is
diverted. What is happening to
your consciousness in such a
situation? We might think that
our consciousness is focused on the
immediate conversation, but at another
level, we must be attending to other
matters that might be important to us.
British
psychologist Colin Cherry (1914–1979)
examined and named this fascinating
aspect of awareness the "Cocktail
Party Phenomenon". The
implications of his findings for
understanding consciousness are quite
important.
In his
experimental method, Cherry had
subjects listen to different messages
presented to each ear
simultaneously. These people
were instructed to pay attention to
the message in one ear but to ignore
the other. Although the subjects
appeared unaware of the message in the
unattended ear, previously presented
"priming words" that were personally
significant to the listener were
randomly presented to that ear.
The subjects showed that they heard
these words in spite of their diligent
attention to the message in the
opposite ear. Their attention to
the listening task was easily diverted
with personally important information.
The results
of this experiment imply that
consciousness is not a single, linear
process. Rather, it is either
multifaceted or it is the result of
completely separate components.
Split
Brain, Split Consciousness.
Roger Sperry (1913-1994) won the Nobel
Prize in 1981 for creating a surgical
technique called a "corpus
callosotomy." This procedure for
controlling the very worst epileptic
seizures uses the logic of a
"fire-break": the two hemispheres of
the brain are surgically separated so
that the out-of-control epileptic
neural impulses are limited only to
the cerebral hemisphere of their
origin. The surgery successfully
worked in lessening the impact of the
disease, but it also opened a new view
of the relationship between the brain
and consciousness: consciousness can
be physically isolated by
interrupting the communication between
the two cerebral hemispheres of the
brain.
Michael
Gazzaniga (b. 1939), a student of
Sperry, designed experiments to
examine the effects of the "split
brain" surgery on the consciousness of
these patients. For example,
some patients were rapidly presented
with visual words, pictures, or real
objects so that the image would only
register in one or the other brain
hemisphere. Then, they were
asked to identify the word, image, or
object that was presented.
The left
hemisphere is the origin of speech, so
when the stimulus was presented there,
the subject could and would respond
orally; when presented to the right
hemisphere, there could be no spoken
response and, in fact, there was
no oral response. However, when
asked to point to or grasp the
stimulus presented to the mute right
hemisphere, the patient succeeded in
identification by pointing or touching
the presented item.
Thus, the consciousness
that directs our spoken words is
separate from the consciousness
that compels our actions.
Furthermore, consciousness is
conclusively a function of the neural
activity of our brains.
Blindsight. Another example of
impaired consciousness resulting from
a damaged brain is "blindsight"—the
rare ability to respond to visual
information without apparent
consciousness of what is viewed.
It sometimes occurs when there is
injury to the primary visual cortex at
the back of the brain. This
dysfunction has been extensively
studied by Lawrence Weiskrantz (b.
1926).
In a clinical
observation, for example, a seemingly
blind patient was seated in front of a
video monitor and asked to describe
what was on the screen. After
reminding the experimenter that she
was blind, the patient was urged to
guess. At that point, the
subject responded with a remarkably
accurate "guess" of the visual image.
Again, as in
auditory information, it appears that
visual stimuli also bypass one level
of consciousness and can be registered
in yet another accessible and
describable sort of awareness.
The Libet
Experiment. In 1983, Benjamin
Libet (1916-2007) studied the
extremely brief time between the
presentation of a stimulus, the conscious
decision to act or not, and the
eventual physical response
itself. These experimental
requirements were something like how a
baseball batter or tennis player
"decides" how and when to react to the
extremely rapid event of a quickly
flying ball.
While
watching a rotating dot on a TV
screen, subjects were asked to decide
whether or not to act as the dot
passed a point of their previous
choosing on the screen, to announce
their intention, and finally to react
by pressing a key. Meantime, the
subject's brain activity (EEG) was
recorded from the frontal (thinking)
and motor (acting) cortex, and their
motor movements were simultaneously
monitored and timed.
Consistently, the motor action and
brain response preceded the conscious
thought, all happening within a half
second.
Unsurprisingly, explanations for these
findings are controversial and have
aroused a great deal of productive
conversation. Are the Libet
findings a verification of the power
of unconsciousness over
conscious action (e.g., James and
Freud)? What do the experimental
results mean for our ideas of "free
will" or the very idea of the mind
(e.g., Kant and John Locke)?
Some Notable
Contemporary Theories
In recent
years, a number of useful theories
have been created from empirical
findings by many excellent
thinkers. Below are four
representative and distinguished
modern theories of
consciousness. While their
differences certainly express the
complex nature of consciousness, these
positions do not compete; rather, they
complement each other in portraying
the complexity of consciousness.
They are each different but valid ways
of looking at the many aspects of
consciousness. The first two of
these theories center on the
subjectivity of our consciousness, and
the latter pair of theories focus on
how consciousness enables cooperation
with other people.
Feature
Integration Theory: Our Personal
View of the World. How does the
incorporation of multi-sensory
information and memory come to create
a unitary understanding of the
"present" of where and who we are
now? Today, scientists speak of
this issue as the "Binding Problem":
how do all of the parts of our
mentality come to produce an
apparently unified "conscious"
experience? Psychologist Anne
Treisman (1935-2018) confronted the
"Binding Problem" and won the National
Medal of Science in 2013 for her
efforts.
Treisman
theorized that "pre-attentive"
processing extracts sensory patterns
into "feature maps." This is
accomplished unconsciously; the
overlaps or consistencies among these
maps then produce "saliency maps"
where we come to consider or create
our own world—our tastes,
attitudes, dispositions, and
beliefs. Give people apples, and
all of their conscious experience and
lifetime of memory tell them what they
are enjoying now. Consciousness,
thus, comes about through unconscious
cooperation among the senses and
memory that produces the consistent
sense of who, where, and when a person
is.
Somatic
Marker Theory: Personal Emotion as
the Basis of Consciousness.
Portuguese-American neuroscientist
António Damasio (b. 1944) developed a
theory of consciousness focusing on
the relationship among our multiple
sensory systems, our seemingly
integrated bodily responses, and our
sense of a unified "self". This
theory proposes that body memory,
"somatic markers," are responsible for
the organization of our conscious
experience and its very personal
nature. Organization of
consciousness is established from
"core consciousness" (the perception
of the present), "extended
consciousness" (the awareness of now
in the context of the immediate past,
or short-term-memory),
"autobiographical memory" (our unique
self), and our "emotional
dispositions" (our attitudes and
intuitions). Damasio's theory, thus,
promotes our conscious selves
according to our lifetime's
experiences of feelings, emotions,
memories, and growth.
Social
Consciousness: How We See the
Consciousness of Others. Italian
neuroscientist Giacomo Rizzolatti (b.
1937) discovered "mirror neurons" in
primates (specifically, the pre-motor
cortex of chimpanzees). These
neural circuits were seen to be active
both during a specific action
and also, most significantly, while
observing others acting
similarly. These findings would
certainly explain our ability to
coordinate our activity with other
people—performing musical, athletic,
social activities, and, possibly most
importantly, playing together.
Perhaps more
basically, the "mirror" cells of our
brains might also be the basis of our
ready tendency to impute our own
mental states, consciousness,
in others.
Theory of
Mind: How We Become a Conscious
Community. David Premack coined
the term "Theory of Mind" (ToM) for
the inductive conclusion that one's
own mental attributes also exist in
others (1978). Accordingly,
higher organisms come to behave
towards others who exhibit similar
behaviors or appearance as if those
others have the same mental
experiences as themselves.
Theoretically, thus, ToM enables
cooperation, empathy, and intention.
As every
parent knows, children normally see
their own feelings in toys, dolls,
pets, and each other very early in
their lives. Indeed, according
to Simon Baron-Cohen (b. 1958),
failure or deficient development of
ToM is the cause of autism and
Asperger syndromes.
Some
Conclusions and Opinions
The
intractable problem of understanding
and explaining consciousness is that
it, or its components, are inherently
subjective. No one knows another
person's own consciousness but that
person. Whether an individual's
means to understand include
observation of other's behaviors,
brain activity, or assessments of
spoken words, every person's
consciousness is unrelentingly
personal and private.
But then,
people's probing of their own
consciousness suffers from the very
weakness in introspective analysis
revealed in early attempts to apply
scientific method to psychological
questions. That there is a
discernible unconscious
component of consciousness means that
the very consciousness that
individuals use in this attempt is
anything but objective and not always,
if ever, dependable. Without
question, the capability of everyone's
own reasoned analysis changes from
moment to moment and sometimes its
competence disappears
completely.
Exactly how
much control do we possess over our
conscious decisions to feel, think,
and act? Are we truly free to
conjure our own thought? And
what does personal conscious freedom
actually mean?
These ancient
questions continue and, plainly, they
are crucial matters to pursue.
This isn't a parlor game. These
are question of how we fit into the
Cosmos and what we must do to progress
and, ultimately, understand
and…survive.
Works Cited
Aquinas, Thomas.
De Veritate. 1256-1259. Html
edition by Joseph Kenny, O.P.,
http://dhspriory.org/thomas/english/QDdeVer.htm
Baron-Cohen, Simon. Autism and
Asperger Syndrome: The Facts.
Oxford University Press, 2008.
Cherry, E. Colin. "Some
experiments on the recognition of speech
with one and with two ears." Journal
of the Acoustical Society of
America 25 (1953), 975.
Cicero, Marcus Tullius. Eight Orations
of Cicero: Together with Selected Passages
and Letters. Charles Henry Forbes,
translator. NY: Appleton Press, 1906.
Damasio, Antonio. Descartes' Error:
Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain.
HarpPeren Press, 1994.
---. The Feeling of What Happens:
Body and Emotion in the Making of
Consciousness. Mariner Books,
2000.
Darwin, Charles. The Descent of Man,
and Selection in Relation to Sex.
1871. Princeton UP, 1981.
Descartes, Rene. Passions of the
Soul. 1649. Translated by
Jonathan Bennett. Accessed October 2010,
http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/
assets/pdfs/descartes1649part2.pdf
Freud, Sigmund. Five Lectures on
Psychoanalysis. 1910. Historical
Books Limited, accessed at
www.publicdomain.org.uk.
Gazzaniga, Michael. The Bisected
Brain. Appleton-Century-Crofts,
1970.
---. Who's in charge? Free will and the
science of the brain. NY: Harper
Collins, 2011.
Hoffman, Donald. Visual
Intelligence: How We Create What We
See. NY: Norton, 1998.
Hoffman, Donald, and Prakash, Chetan.
"Objects of consciousness." Frontiers
in Psychology, 2014.
https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/
10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00577/full
James, William. Principles of
Psychology. 1890. Classics in the
History of Psychology,
accessed at
http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/James/Principles/
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure
Reason. 1781. The Cambridge
Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant.
Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Kuhn, Robert Lawrence. "10 Marvin Minsky
Quotes that Reflect What a Visionary He
Was." Huffington Post.
Leibniz, Gottfried. The
Principles of Philosophy known as
Monadology. 1720. Translation by
Jonathan Bennett, 2007.
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pdfs/leibniz1714b.pdf
Libet, Benjamin, et al. "Time of
Conscious Intention to Act in Relation
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Locke, John. An Essay Concerning
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Premack, David and Woodruff, Guy. "Does
the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?" Behavioral
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Ramachandran, V.S. A Brief Tour
of Human Consciousness: From Imposter
Poodles to Purple Numbers. NY:
Pi Press, 2004.
Rizzolatti, Giacomo. Mirrors In The
Brain: How Our Minds Share Actions and
Emotions. Oxford UP, 2013.
Treisman, Anne. "Preattentive Processing
in Vision." Computer Vision,
Graphics, and Image Processing
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Author's
Biography
William House
is Carolina Distinguished Professor of
Psychology Emeritus at the University
of South Carolina Aiken. He
taught and did research in perception
and cognition, neuroscience, the
history of psychology, and the
psychology of music. From 1985
to 1992, Dr. House served as Dean of
the College of Social Sciences and
Professions at the University of South
Carolina Aiken.
Dr. House
received the Bachelor of Music and
Master of Science in Clinical
Psychology from The University of
North Texas and the Ph.D. in
Experimental Psychology from the
University of South Carolina
Columbia.
Dr. House
originally delivered his paper on
"Consciousness" to the Torch Club of
Augusta, Georgia on February 1,
2017.
He may be
reached at williamhouse1@comcast.net.
©2018
by the International Association of
Torch Clubs
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