The Torch Magazine,
The Journal and Magazine of the
International Association of Torch Clubs
For 93 Years
A Peer-Reviewed
Quality Controlled
Publication
ISSN Print 0040-9440
ISSN Online 2330-9261
Fall
2018
Volume 92, Issue 1
American
Political Economy:
Forty Years of Metastatic
Normality
The 2018 Paxton Award Winner
by Roland F.
Moy
The election of 2016 produced a
national administration that promised
to accelerate annual economic growth
from a modest 2 percent to a more
robust 3 or 4 percent, using a
combination of less regulation plus
tax cuts on personal and corporate
incomes. The evolution of
economic activity over the past four
decades offers evidence that this
undertaking will face severe headwinds
from previous changes in regulation
and economic practice that severely
curtail the possibilities of improving
either overall economic production or
productivity per worker.
Recent publications have described the
contours of the past two centuries of
economic growth patterns, which place
the mid-twentieth century as a high
point in reaping the economic rewards
of earlier inventions and production
innovations unlikely to be repeated in
this century. By contrast,
American economic and production
patterns over the past forty years
have resulted from globalization and
were enabled by government policy
changes on financial manipulation, and
have metastasized into the sclerotic
conditions that will greatly impede
any major departure from the current
political economy normality. The
following presentation will expand
upon these trends and concepts and
conclude with a proposal for gaining
momentum that would move America
toward a new normal.
Long Term Trends
Robert J. Gordon's detailed
presentation of data and discussion of
living standard changes from 1870 to
the present in his The Rise And
Fall Of American Growth reveal
the contours of change that support
the conclusion of the book's title.
The annualized growth rate of output
per person reached 2.41% per year from
1920 to 1970, and the output per hour
grew at 2.82% annually (14).
This fifty year bulge in productivity
significantly exceeds the 1.84% per
person growth rate in the 1870 to 1920
period and the 1.77% figure from 1970
to 2014, as well as the output per
hour of only 1.79 in the first period
and 1.62 in the recent time
frame. A chart displaying the
three major components of productivity
growth reveals that while the
contributions of education and capital
investment average about the same for
the three time periods, the residual
reflecting the underlying input of
innovation and technological change is
almost triple for the middle 50-year
period of 1920 to 1970 (16).
Multiple innovations during this time
frame revolved around the many
creative applications to be made of
the two primary technological
inventions of the nineteenth century
that came into universal use during
the mid-twentieth century decades:
mass produced electricity and the
internal combustion engine. Both
inventions inspired innovative
applications in workplace and farming
productivity as well as improvements
for household comfort and
transportation. Providing the
force multiplier that replaced animal
and steam power across the country,
electrical power and the internal
combustion engine supported new
powered tools and household appliances
as well as new toys and
entertainments.
The overview information provided by
Gross Domestic Product changes do not
capture the many improvements in
living standards that occurred during
this time, such as the elimination of
the household need to haul water,
wood, or ice; the value of instant
communication; the improvement in
health and life expectancy; or the
availability and time for personal
travel. By 1970 the rapid pace
of conversion of the economy and
household living to modern standards
was slowing down as nearly universal
participation was approached, and a
variety of one-time changes were
effected: the end of child labor, the
broad expansion of secondary
education, completion of a national
and Interstate highway system, jet
airplanes in common use, and the
emergence of large scale female
employment.
According to Gordon's analysis, the
innovations in information and
communication technology of the
post-1970 period have had a narrower
impact, mostly in entertainment and
convenience, rather than in continuing
improvements in productivity.
There was a small spike in
productivity during the 1995 to 2004
decade with growth averaging 2.05
percent, but the decade after that
averaged only 1.30 percent in
productivity growth while reaching
just 0.6 percent in 2014 (Gordon
328). This same general shape of
twentieth century
improvement-and-slowdown in economic
and social wellbeing is also described
in two chapters of American
Amnesia as moving over the
"Great Divide" of previous living
standards and "Coming Up Short" in
recent decades (Hacker). There
are a variety of explanations about
why recent decades have been sclerotic
in economic growth and living standard
improvement, with Gordon emphasizing a
lack of game changing invention and
Hacker focusing more on the lack of
cooperative endeavor between
government and the marketplace (see
also Shapiro). Another recent
publication, however, provides a
detailed analysis in support of the
conclusion that financial factors
present major headwinds that both
curtail private sector innovation and
forestall cooperative nudges from
government policy.
Metastatic
Headwinds For Growth
The past forty years have witnessed
many changes in financial sector
operations and in the financial
structure of business
operations. These are described
with great detail by long time
business and economic journalist Rana
Foroohar in Makers And Takers: The
Rise Of Finance And The Fall Of
American Business.
Up to the 1970s, major economic and
workplace patterns were still largely
shaped by the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act,
which had separated commercial and
consumer banking from speculative
investment banking. Employee
rewards and workplace standards were
undergirded by union contracts that
encouraged business decisions made
with the interests of workers as
stakeholders in mind, plus a wage
floor provided by an adequate minimum
wage.
The creep of toxic challenges to these
established financial patterns began
in the 1960s when First National City
bank blurred the line between lending
and trading by inventing the
negotiable certificate of deposit or
CD. These began to function as a
limited time savings account for
companies and the rich who could
afford the $100,000 buy-in and thereby
reap the higher than normal interest
rate. The bank also cashed in by
trading the CDs on a secondary market
that likely violated the
Glass-Steagall rules, but neither the
government nor the Federal Reserve
offered any push back.
Then, in 1967, First National City
introduced the first credit card,
which helped start the trend that
eroded the regulations regarding
interest rates and the price of
credit. The success of these
profit sources led to a name change to
Citibank in 1976 and to emulation
among other financial institutions
seeking high-yield products.
Further innovation brought the first
mutual funds, the packaging of
mortgages into securities, and the
first derivatives in the form of
futures trading. The lure of
higher yield from these securitization
options helped to turn finance and
banking into a more self-contained
high-stakes Wall Street sector, rather
than a utility that facilitated Main
Street business. There was also
a gradual erosion of the Regulation Q
interest rate ceiling that was
designed to curb the unbridled credit
growth that leads to speculation,
bubbles, and financial crises.
Gradual credit growth is needed on
Main Street to facilitate consumer
spending and home buying, but the
corporate desire and lobbying to grow
the trade in CDs and other submarkets
prompted the government and the
Federal Reserve to "let the market
decide" the rate of credit growth,
rather than to confront the political
challenge of establishing, by law or
by stipulation, reserve requirements
that prioritized lending to
individuals over lending to
corporations. This challenge is
still with us.
The 1970s also saw the first steps to
broaden financial speculation
globally. In 1974, Wall Street
lobbying induced the government to
overturn a law forbidding US
commercial institutions to make loans
to risky third world nations in need
of development cash. By the end
of the decade, many of these loans
were in default, leading to US
government bailout packages for
countries in trouble (such as Mexico)
and for American banks (such as Citi),
thereby confirming that in practice
some market firms are too big to
fail. Despite this newly
confirmed political economy challenge,
the risks and volatility of the
domestic market were further increased
when in 1980 the Carter administration
was prompted to abandon Regulation Q
entirely, thereby opening "a whole new
world of variable-rate mortgages, ever
more complex securities, derivatives
to hedge them all, and the rapidly
swelling financial institutions that
would make vast fortunes on them […]"
(Foroohar 52). For the Main
Street consumers baffled and
disadvantaged by this new reality, and
as a replacement for the governmental
regulatory standards that had been
adopted in response to the
free-wheeling financial manipulations
of the 1920s that had led to the Great
Depression, the financial industry's
answer was to preach the need for more
"financial literacy."
The Reagan administration added fuel
to the financialization fire.
The 1981 tax reform sharply lowered
the tax on capital gains, setting the
stage for the current practice of Wall
Street transaction income being
declared "carried interest" to avoid
the higher income tax rate. In
1984 Reagan signed the Secondary
Mortgage Market Enhancement Act, which
exempted mortgage-backed securities
from state regulation of new financial
products, removed restrictions against
institutions like pension funds from
investing in these risky financial
instruments, and required ratings
agencies to play a role in ensuring
low-risk quality for investors.
What could possibly go wrong? As
was revealed after the 2008 economic
crash, the ratings agencies were put
in the moral hazard position of being
paid for their services only if the
security sold, leading to an abundance
of AAA and other undeserved ratings.
The 1980s also witnessed U.S. support
for relaxing international currency
controls, allowing a huge increase in
capital flow around the world, making
it easier to invest in cheap labor
production in third world countries
and to place speculative bets on
currency values. Globalization
was now on steroids. This decade
also saw tax rule changes that fueled
a booming business in Leveraged
Buyouts (later called Private Equity
transactions): short-term money-makers
that used tax-deductible borrowed
money to buy targeted companies.
In many of the leveraged buyouts,
dividend payouts and fee earnings for
the Wall Street investors were boosted
for a few years by laying off workers
deemed surplus and slashing research
and development expenses (Kosman). The
depleted company would then be sold
and be at risk as another Main Street
bankruptcy.
The relaxation of rules for investment
banking continued into the
1990s. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act, passed in 1999, repealed the
remnants of the 1933 Glass-Steagall
Act that had separated investment from
commercial banking. The
following year, the Commodity Futures
Modernization Act exempted most
derivatives and credit default swaps
from regulatory scrutiny.
Rewards for the financial sector
continued in 2003 when the capital
gains tax rate was cut to 15%, and in
2004 the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) was successfully
lobbied to remove rules that capped
leverage at fifteen to one. That
same year the SEC also lifted a rule
specifying debt limits and capital
reserves, allowing firms to police
themselves (self regulation) in the
marketplace using their highly touted
mathematical risk models. The
stage was thereby set for huge profits
to be made on Wall Street through
financial instruments little known to
regulators or to the general public
and through proliferation of
off-the-books "shadow banking"
practices using "structured investment
vehicles" to hide the actual level of
risk in play, thereby evading the
remaining capital requirement rules
(Foroohar 60). These practices
also led to the economic crash reality
check of 2008, the subsequent bailout
of firms too big to fail, and the
current huge profits still acquired by
these same firms despite efforts at
supervision under the Dodd-Frank
legislation passed in 2010.
The financial sector still represents
only 7% of the economy, but manages to
acquire 25% of all corporate profits
while creating only 4% of all jobs
(Foroohar x). The low percentage of
jobs relative to profit results in
part from the current practice of
computerized arbitrage-trading, which
"...us[es] flash programs designed to
trade on fractional price changes over
split-second time intervals, reducing
the average holding period of a stock
from about eight months in the 1960s
to just four months by 2012"
(Forhoohar 113). The plethora of
pathological practices still in place
in the financial sector have turned
Wall Street trading and related
activities into an economy-dominating
profit center, rather than a utility
serving the larger corporate economy
based on Main Street. This skewed
situation will impede any attempt to
boost broadly based economic
growth. Efforts to undercut
Dodd-Frank regulations will continue
(Merle), as in the successful last
minute amendment to the must-pass
spending bill of December, 2014, that
allowed Wall Street banks to
eventually add up to $10 trillion in
risky swaps trades to their books
(Warren 155).
Corporate
Pathologies
The dysfunction of American
corporations in recent decades is
primarily a result of the metastatic
growth of shareholder value rewards to
the detriment of all other
considerations, coupled with the
decline of labor union pushback.
The primacy of shareholder value
gained legal standing with the 1919
Michigan Supreme Court case Dodge
v. Ford Motor Co., in which the
Dodge brothers successfully sued to
force the Ford Motor Company to use
profits to pay dividends to them and
other shareholders instead of
investing in more and better
production. This precedent
gained more importance with the 1982
SEC decision to allow stock buybacks
to boost their value for shareholders,
a group that now included corporate
executives rewarded with stock
options; this pattern was embellished
in the 1990s when executives were
allowed to buy company stock at below
market rates. Instead of
providing longer term value by
improving products and production
efficiency, the short term interest in
rewarding shareholders and executives
has induced a pathological desire to
artificially boost share prices such
that:
S&P
500 companies have spent $4 trillion
on buybacks between 2005 and 2015,
representing at least 52.5 percent
of their net earnings, and another
$2.5 trillion on dividends which
amounted to 37.5 percent. In
2014, buybacks and dividends
represented 105 percent of net
earnings of publicly traded American
companies; in 2015, they reached
above 115 percent. (Foroohar
131)
The
low interest rates of the post-2008
years were meant to encourage Main
Street business growth and home
ownership. Instead the low rates
have encouraged stock buy-backs on
borrowed money, investor domination of
the stressed housing market, and a
booming stock market, developments
which have all primarily benefited
Wall Street and harmed Main Street
savings account earnings. This
pattern in corporate America
shortchanges the other economic
elements that help to make a thriving
economy and long-term growth
including: investment in
research and development; higher wages
that boost consumer spending; and
investment in worker training to match
(the missing) capital goods
improvements.
Our primary competitors in Europe and
Asia do not follow this pattern of
misapplying net profit, so the
competitive prognosis for future
American growth is problematic.
Too many American firms have boosted
profits by cutting costs and
investment, rather than by selling
more and better products. The
result is that the current recovery is
based not upon organic growth, but
from government policies influenced by
corporate lobbying plus corporate
contrivances that have caused profits
to peak in 2015 and then to flatten
and fall (Foroohar 145). And now
we are privileged to observe how a CEO
President attempts to reshape
government to work more like a
corporate
business.
A New Normal?
Proposals for improvement must cope
with the toxic headwinds described
above. Forty years in the making, they
have not only held back economic
production and productivity
improvements, but also fostered less
economic parity and more political
unrest. Both production and
productivity may continue to improve
with robotic automation in the
workplace and artificial intelligence
applications for driverless cars and
trucks, among other things; these
innovations would increase efficiency
and wealth for those owning the
technology, but not provide dignified
work and security for the
masses. An optimist can call for
improved education and training to
take advantage of accelerated changes
in technology, globalization, and
climate change (Friedman).
Following this advice may produce
extraordinary results for the select
few who succeed on this path, but it
will not provide a floor for a living
wage across the economy nor make the
game-changing innovations that could
jump-start a higher sustained level of
economic growth or of productivity
gains.
It is more likely that workers will be
displaced by automation and, if we
accept the notion advanced by some
that people are worth only what they
earn (1), become part of a class of
useless poor people. This
depressing possibility, plus misplaced
faith in tax cuts as an economic fix
(Hassett) (2), provide little reason
to be optimistic about significant
change for the better within the
current economic sclerosis and the
civic religion framework that blames
poor people for being poor.
Another response is the movement
calling for a paradigm shift:
Universal Basic Income support in a
"post-work society"
(Livingston). This support would
provide enough for a non-poverty
existence, with each adult choosing
how much employment income they desire
to supplement it. Some
libertarians like it as a way to
reduce the welfare state. Most
liberals view it as a living wage
platform that might ensure well-being,
secure greater freedom to choose
career options, and provide leverage
to negotiate suitable employment
conditions. A step in that
direction might include a
transformation of the Earned Income
Tax Credit into a full negative income
tax that provided income to all poor
households. One estimate of cost
places it at $250 to $300 billion,
which might justly be paid for with a
Wall Street financial transaction tax
(Block). If such a program is
ever initiated, it would help not only
to overcome the income inequality
divide, which would boost both
consumer demand and production, but
also to promote the solidarity that
undergirds our constitutional
stability.
The political mobilization that has
been evident since early in 2017 would
be a necessary starting point for such
a new normal to emerge. But it
would have to overcome the 2016
winning election strategy that
cleverly misdirected legitimate
grievances away from the actual
problems, as discussed above, while
being financially backed by the Wall
Street and corporate interests that
have benefitted from the forty year
metastatic concentration of wealth and
power. We may yet undergo a
validity test of the famous
observation by jurist Louis D.
Brandeis: "We may have
democracy, or we may have wealth
concentrated in the hands of a few,
but we cannot have both."
Notes
1.
Billionaire administration backer Robert
Spencer is reported to believe that
"human beings have no inherent value
other than how much money they make."
(Levitz)
2. Analyses of
data from 1945 to 2012 show that
reductions in the top capital gains tax
rate and top marginal income tax rate do
not appear correlated with savings,
investment, economic growth, or
productivity growth. Such tax cuts
do appear to be associated with
increasing concentrations of income at
the top of the income distribution.
(Hungerford)
Works Cited
Block, Fred, et
al. "A Basic Income Would Upend
America's Work Ethic – and That's a
Good Thing." The Nation,
August 23, 2016.
Foroohar, Rana. Makers And
Takers: The Rise Of Finance And The
Fall Of American Business. New
York: Crown Business, 2016.
Friedman, Thomas L. Thank You
For Being Late: An Optimist's Guide to
Thriving in the Age of Accelerations.
New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux,
2016.
Gordon, Robert J. The Rise And Fall
Of American Growth: The U.S. Standard
Of Living Since The Civil War.
Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2016.
Hacker, Jacob S. et al.
American Amnesia: How The War On
Government Led Us To Forget What
Made America Prosper. New
York: Simon & Schuster, 2016.
Hassett, Kevin A. "Recovery
through Tax Reform." National
Review, December 19, 2016.
Hungerford, Thomas L. "Taxes and
the Economy: An Economic Analysis of the
Top Tax Rates Since 1945." Congressional
Research Service, September 14,
2012.
Kosman, Josh. The Buyout of
America: How Private Equity Will
Cause the Next Great Credit Crisis.
New York: Portfolio, 2009.
Levitz, Eric. " 'Small Government'
Conservatism Is Killing Republican
Voters." New York Magazine,
March 26, 2017.
Livingston, James. No More
Work: Why Full Employment Is A Bad
Idea. Chapel Hill: UNC
Press, 2016.
Merle, Renae. "Republicans launch
effort to roll back the Dodd-Frank
banking regulations." The
Washington Post, April 26,
2017.
Shapiro, Thomas M. Toxic
Inequality: How America's
Wealth Gap Destroys Mobility, Deepens
the Racial Divide, and Threatens
Our Future. New York: Basic
Books, 2017.
Warren, Elizabeth. This Is Our
Fight: The Battle To Save America's
Middle Class. New York:
Metropolitan Books, 2017.
Author's
Biography
Roland F. Moy earned
the Ph.D. in political science from Ohio
State University. After teaching
for 30 years, primarily in the field of
international studies, he retired from
Appalachian State University in
1998. In addition to
participation, presentations, and office
holding in professional organizations,
he was active in organizing Model United
Nations events each year for both high
school and college students.
A lifelong singer, he
continues a century-long family
tradition of quartet singing. He has
also been active with the local Arts
Council in organizing and producing
musical shows to raise funds for music
scholarships, and in producing fifteen
annual summer community chorus
events.
Since joining the
Torch Club in Boone, NC in 2007, Moy has
developed several papers that apply a
core political science concern about
abuse of power to the related field of
economics. One of these won the
2012 Paxton Award.
This paper, his
second Paxton-winning effort, was
originally presented to the Wyoming
Valley Torch Club. Some details were
updated for its presentation at the
Torch Convention in San Antonio this
past summer, and for its publication
here.
©2018
by the International Association of
Torch Clubs
Return to Home Page
|
|